Failure and success of jihadi information operations on the Internet by Zoto, Edval N.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2013-12
Failure and success of jihadi information operations
on the Internet
Zoto, Edval N.














Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
FAILURE AND SUCCESS OF JIHADI INFORMATION 








Thesis Advisor:  Glenn E. Robinson 
Second Reader: T. Camber Warren 
 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704–0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, 
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send 
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to 
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 
22202–4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington, DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
December 2013 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE   
FAILURE AND SUCCESS OF JIHADI INFORMATION OPERATIONS ON THE 
INTERNET 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
 
6. AUTHOR(S)  Edval N. Zoto 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943–5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy 
or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. IRB Protocol number ____N/A____.  
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
Obscure entities, individuals, and organizations engaged in jihad have made the Internet their most powerful tool for 
conducting information operations. Internet outlets, especially social networking sites, provide jihadis with access to 
the whole world. At the same time, the current Internet environment allows sustainable research about the uses of 
these resources for the cause of jihad, and simultaneously provides new opportunities to counterterrorist agencies.  
This thesis proposes an “artisanal” approach to analyze jihadism on the Internet. Specifically, by identifying 
prominent jihadi leaders’ recommendations on the spread of the call to jihad by fellow jihadis, we set up assumptions 
on what potentially makes jihadi information operations on social networking sites successful. Sets of data publicly 
available on the Internet and within the most popular social networking sites are identified and framed in line with the 
jihadi leadership recommendations. A case study and related data are gathered and analyzed to test these assumptions. 
The results of the analysis may enable researchers to speed data collection by identifying only potentially successful 
jihadi presences on the Web, and allow counterterrorist bodies to target jihadi Web spaces efficiently. The thesis also 
provides a background on jihadi approaches to public relations, an empirical analysis of terrorists’ challenges and 
counterterrorists opportunities on the Internet, a case study and a methodology for analyzing jihadism on the most 
visited social networking sites. 
 
 
14. SUBJECT TERMS: jihadi information operations, social networking sites, intelligence, online 
jihad, web-based jihadism, Internet control, intelligence, counterterrorism, Albanian language. 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
145 

















NSN 7540–01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2–89)  
 Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239–18 
 i 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 ii 
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 




Edval N. Zoto 
Captain, Armed Forces of the Republic of Albania 
B.A., University of Turin, 2007 
M.Sc., University of Turin, 2009 
M. 2nd L., ISSAT Institute, Tirana, 2011 
MAS, UBIS University, Geneva, 2011 
 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 
 



















T. Camber Warren  




John Arquilla  
Chair, Department of Defense Analysis 
 iii 




Obscure entities, individuals, and organizations engaged in jihad have made the Internet 
their most powerful tool for conducting information operations. Internet outlets, 
especially social networking sites, provide jihadis with access to the whole world. At the 
same time, the current Internet environment allows sustainable research about the uses of 
these resources for the cause of jihad, and simultaneously provides new opportunities to 
counterterrorist agencies.  
This thesis proposes an “artisanal” approach to analyze jihadism on the Internet. 
Specifically, by identifying prominent jihadi leaders’ recommendations on the spread of 
the call to jihad by fellow jihadis, we set up assumptions on what potentially makes jihadi 
information operations on social networking sites successful. Sets of data publicly 
available on the Internet and within the most popular social networking sites are 
identified and framed in line with the jihadi leadership recommendations. A case study 
and related data are gathered and analyzed to test these assumptions. The results of the 
analysis may enable researchers to speed data collection by identifying only potentially 
successful jihadi presences on the Web, and allow counterterrorist bodies to target jihadi 
Web spaces efficiently. The thesis also provides a background on jihadi approaches to 
public relations, an empirical analysis of terrorists’ challenges and counterterrorists 
opportunities on the Internet, a case study and a methodology for analyzing jihadism on 
the most visited social networking sites. 
 
 v 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 vi 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
I. INTRODUCTION: EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT OF JIHADISM 
ON THE INTERNET ..................................................................................................1 
A. INTRODUCTION............................................................................................1 
B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE ................................................3 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW ...............................................................................3 
D. THEORY ..........................................................................................................6 
E. METHODOLOGY ..........................................................................................7 
II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNET AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE 
WEB-BASED JIHAD ................................................................................................11 
A. THE PHASES OF THE INTERNET EVOLUTION .................................11 
B. JIHADIS AND THEIR PUBLIC IMAGE ...................................................12 
C. TERRORISM AS A COMMUNICATION PROCESS..............................15 
D. WEB-BASED JIHADISM IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11: 
OPPORTUNITIES ........................................................................................16 
E. WEB-BASED JIHADISM IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11: 
PROBLEMS FROM WITHIN .....................................................................18 
F. WEB-BASED JIHADISM IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11: 
PROBLEMS FROM OUTSIDE ...................................................................23 
G. JIHADISM IN THE TWO EVOLUTIONARY PHASES OF THE 
INTERNET .....................................................................................................24 
III. OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND LIMITS OF THE 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM ON 
THE INTERNET .......................................................................................................33 
A. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS OF INTERNET CONTROL ............................33 
B. THE “NO” CONTROL SCENARIO ...........................................................33 
C. THE “FAIR” CONTROL SCENARIO .......................................................37 
D. THE “TOTAL” CONTROL SCENARIO ...................................................40 
E. CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................41 
IV. THE NATURE OF THE JIHADI ENTERPRISE IN THE BALKANS: THE 
ALBANIAN CASE.....................................................................................................43 
A. A SHORT BACKGROUND .........................................................................43 
B. THE EMERGENCE OF FOREIGN RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE ...........44 
C. THE CHARITIES NETWORK ...................................................................47 
D. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS IN SUPPORTING TERRORISM IN ALBANIA ....49 
E. THE RELIGIOUS TENSION WITHIN ALBANIA ..................................50 
F. PAST TERRORIST THREATS TO ALBANIA ........................................51 
G. THE COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIONS OF THE ALBANIAN 
SECURITY FORCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS .............................53 
H. JIHADI LEFTOVERS AND POTENTIAL THREATS ............................56 
 vii 
I. CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES FOR THE PRESENT AND 
FUTURE .........................................................................................................59 
V. ANALYSIS OF JIHADI INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN THE 
ALBANIAN LANGUAGE ON  SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES .....................63 
A. PREVIOUS RESEARCH ..............................................................................63 
B. ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
PROMINENT JIHADIS ON THE USE OF THE INTERNET ................67 
C. BUILDING AND ANALYZING THE DATASET .....................................72 
1. Where To Start? .................................................................................72 
2. Local Language-Driven Research ....................................................73 
3. A Subject Driven Research ...............................................................75 
4. Creating the Dataset ..........................................................................77 
a. Quantity and Outreach ...........................................................78 
b. Networking ..............................................................................79 
c. Specific Tailoring ....................................................................80 
d. Audiovisual Exploitation ........................................................81 
D. RESULTS FROM THE DATASET ANALYSIS .......................................82 
VI. COMBINED SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
COUNTERING JIHADI INFORMATION OPERATIONS  ON THE 
INTERNET .................................................................................................................91 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS .........................................................................91 
B. OPTIONS FOR COUNTERING JIHADI INFORMATION 
OPERATIONS ON THE INTERNET .........................................................93 
APPENDIX A .........................................................................................................................97 
APPENDIX B .......................................................................................................................101 
LIST OF REFERENCES ....................................................................................................113 




LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Model of how users judge the credibility of online information  (from 
Wathen and Burkell, 2002, p. 141). .................................................................65 
Figure 2. A screenshot of the search results by using the keyword “xhihad” (Alb.)  
in YouTube. .....................................................................................................74 
Figure 3. Visualization obtained through ORA Network Visualizer. The 
visualization represents the network of interacting users (commenters) and 
the jihadi information operations which are colored by subject. 
(Afghanistan/Iraq in grey; general call to jihad in dark purple; jihadi 
leaders in peach; Syrian conflict in green; and West vs. Islam in yellow). .....87 
Figure 4. Visualization obtained through ORA Network Visualizer. The triangles 
(red) represent the jihadi information operations, the squares (by color) the 
class of topic which they address, and the circles (black) the channel 
owners. .............................................................................................................88 
Figure 5. Albania’s score in the TI, CPI 2012. (Transparency International, 2013) .......98 
Figure 6. GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s grid view. The terrorist 
attacks in Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo, from 
1991‒2011, extracted from the amount of terrorist attacks that occurred in 
the Balkan. The attacks that were perpetrated by Islamic-related groups 
who were identified as attackers have occurred only in Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Croatia, and Hungary; nevertheless most of the attackers are 
not identified properly. See Figure 7 for proper explanation. ........................101 
Figure 7. GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s grid view. The terrorist 
attacks of unidentified perpetrators in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania, 
divided by their affiliation. See Figure 8 for a temporal distribution of the 
attacks. ...........................................................................................................102 
Figure 8. GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s Timeline view. The 
terrorist attacks occurred in Albania from 1990‒2011. The peak coincides 
with the year 1997, when Albania faced civil disorders due to Ponzi 
scheme failures...............................................................................................102 
Figure 9. GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s Timeline view. The 
terrorist attacks occurred in Kosovo from 1990‒2011. The peak coincides 
with the years 1999‒2001, when the Kosovo Albanian started the war 
against Serbian authorities requesting independence. Although a United 
Nations-mandated international military contingent occupied the strategic 
areas, since June 1999 after Serbian Army retreated from the province, in 
attempt to establish a buffer zone between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo 
Albanians, the attacks continued by ethnic paramilitary groups of both 
sides................................................................................................................103 
Figure 10. GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s Timeline view. The 
terrorist attacks occurred in Bosnia from 1990‒2011. The peak coincides 
with the years 1992‒1998, a period of high tension within the country due 
 ix 
to political disagreements and ethnic clashes, despite the war being 
officially over since 1995, after the signing of the Dayton accords. .............103 
Figure 11. GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s Timeline view. The 
terrorist attacks occurred in Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia from 
1990‒2011......................................................................................................104 
Figure 12. Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s link analysis 
tool, Auto view. The Balkans Islamic-oriented organization’s network, 
1992‒2004......................................................................................................104 
Figure 13. Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s Social 
Network Analysis Tool. The centralities of the ten most central Islamic-
related organizations in the Balkans. .............................................................105 
Figure 14. Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s link analysis 
tool, Auto view. The Balkans Islamic-oriented NGOs, charities, and 
globally recognized terrorist organizations’ network, 1992‒2004. See 
Figure 15 for further explanation on links. ....................................................106 
Figure 15. Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s link analysis 
tool, Histogram. The Balkans Islamic-oriented NGOs, charities, and 
globally recognized terrorist organizations’s network, 1992‒2004. The 
numbers following the entities show the number of links within the 
network. .........................................................................................................107 
Figure 16. Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s link analysis 
tool, Auto view. The Balkans Islamic-oriented NGOs and charities 
network, 1992‒2004. See Figure 17 for the importance of each in terms of 
centrality within the network. ........................................................................108 
Figure 17. Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s link analysis 
tool, Auto view, and Search Around. The Islamic-related entities, and 
events in Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo, 1992‒2012. At the top are the 
Islamic-related organizations, while on the flanks can be found entities 
connected directly to them. The Search Around feature of Palantir enables 
phased research. From top to bottom (flanks) are entities connected 
sequentially with each other. At the bottom there is the same 
representation, including the events in which the entities are involved. .......110 
Figure 18. GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s Map, using the Heatmap 
Density Tool, with a Radius of 15 km and Area Unit 1 km2. The terrorist 
attacks occurred in Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia from 1990‒2011. Note 
highest density hotspots in Bosnia coincide with the AOR of foreign 
Islamic paramilitary forces, Zenica in central Bosnia, and Moaca Gornja in 
the Northeast of the country. ..........................................................................111 
 
 x 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Terrorists, the government, and the media (from Combs, 2006, p. 169). ........17 
Table 2. Measurement data of jihadi recommended elements for success of jihadi 
information operations. ....................................................................................70 
Table 3. The five most popular (in terms of number of views and number of 
views/day) jihadi information operations from the dataset..............................83 
Table 4. Statistics on religion in Balkan countries.........................................................97 
Table 5. The South East Europe (SEE) countries Corruption Perceptions Index 
(CPI) 2012. In the global chart Denmark was positioned first with 90 
points and Somalia as last with 174 points (from Transparency 
International, 2013) ..........................................................................................97 
Table 6. Islamic organizations in Albania linked with terrorism (from Kullolli, 
2009) ................................................................................................................99 
Table 7. Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s Social 
Network Analysis Tool. The centralities of the five most central Islamic 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 xii 
LIST OF ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS 
AF Al Furqan 
AHF Al Haramain Foundation 
AMC  Albanian Muslim Community 
BIF  Benevolence International Foundation 
DP  Democratic Party (Albania) 
EIG  Egyptioan Islamic Group 
FYROM  Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 
GIA  Algerian Islamic Armed Group 
GIMF  Global Islamic Media Front 
GRF Global Relief Fund 
IIRO  International Islamic Relief Agency (aka IGASA) 
NGO  Non-governmental Organization 
NIS  National Information Service (Albania) 
RIHS  Revival of Islamic Heritage Society 
SJRCK  Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo 
SNA  Social Network Analysis 
TI  Taibah International 
TWRA  Third World Relief Agency 
UN  United Nations 
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
  
 xiii 




First of all, I express my greatest appreciation for that excellent and resourceful 
relationship between Albania and the United States of America. May this relationship last 
forever and become stronger! This work would have not been done without the support 
received by the Combatting Terrorism Fellowship Program (CTFP). 
I would like to acknowledge my gratitude to every Defense Analysis Department 
professor with whom I had the pleasure to study, and at the foremost the two of them who 
have been working with me closely toward the completion of this thesis: Prof. Glenn 
Robinson and Prof. Camber Warren.  
I am very grateful for the wonderful experiences I had during my stay at the U.S. 
Naval Postgraduate School, and the merits for that go to my DA cohort. I wish all of 
them happiness in their family life and a bright career. A special salute goes to the “Ro-
204 fanatics.” 
I would like to dedicate this work to the woman who keeps my heart warm and 
my brain cold, my dear wife, Alba. 
 xv 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 
 xvi 
I. INTRODUCTION: EVALUATION AND ASSESSMENT OF 
JIHADISM ON THE INTERNET  
A. INTRODUCTION 
It is globally accepted that terrorists in general and jihadists in particular use the 
Internet as their main propaganda tool. This assertion is not difficult to prove, since 
anyone with a computer and an Internet connection can run a search and find himself 
flooded with jihadi related materials. The quantity and quality of the uploaded 
information by jihadists has evolved with the development of the Internet. In the early 
2000s, after the invasion of Afghanistan by U.S. and coalition forces, al Qaeda’s 
information operations went entirely online, due to the pressure and physical dangers of 
the real world. Jihadist propaganda was mainly conducted through traditional Web pages, 
and communications were mostly conducted through mailing lists. The jihadist narrative 
was preserved and controlled through a centralized virtual infrastructure. Despite the 
unlimited spread of these websites, due to the nondiscriminatory nature of the Internet, 
conducting an effective propaganda campaign was still difficult. First, websites needed 
publicity, and when they achieved high visibility, these websites incurred the risk of 
being shut down by security agencies. Second, due to technological requisites, a jihadi 
Web manager needed funds to keep the website running and also advanced technical 
capabilities to cover his virtual activity. The situation changed drastically with the 
advance of the Web virtual infrastructure and the emergence of a new sort of Internet 
product, the social networking sites.  
A few years after terrorists had to transfer their propaganda efforts to the Web, 
they also needed to change their strategies. Conway (2012) recalling the al Qaeda case, 
gives two reasons for the change. The first was the impossibility of al-Qaeda’s 
centralized structure to exercise control over the jihadist narrative. An important event 
illustrating this problem was the appearance of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi on the Web with 
his famous videos, including one in which he decapitated the American journalist 
Nicholas Berg (Conway, 2012, p. 13). A second reason lies in technological development 
and the emergence of new social networking platforms on the Internet landscape, such as 
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Facebook, in 2004, and You Tube, in 2005 (p. 14) that diversified the ways of 
transmission and representation of the information. Social networking sites not only 
provided a cheaper and easier way to spread jihadi content online, but also enabled 
jihadists to work with their public directly, in real time, if necessary. Now, a few years 
later , the terrorists have perfectly adapted themselves to that environment. Ressa (2012, 
p. 7) maintains that despite the failure on the ground, al Qaeda’s ideology is spreading 
virulently in the virtual world, and the social media is the new battlefield. Also their 
strategies have changed significantly. Forster (2012) indicates that “jihadists have shifted 
from being consumers of information to “networked participants” (p. 29). Further on, he 
maintains that “virtual networks, and associated media allow information to be shared 
quickly and permit active participation that enhances learning, cooperation, and 
innovation, thus enabling small groups and even individuals to accomplish big things.” 
But, what do these developments mean? From one perspective, it might be 
suggested that, given the new opportunities the jihadi cause will successfully achieve its 
objectives. Still, a decade after the emergence of the social networking sites and the 
increase in the world population’s access to the Internet, there has been no significant 
achievement of the jihad1, as it was professed by Osama bin Laden and his followers in 
the late 1990s. This does not mean that jihadi information strategies have failed, or that 
the overall success of the jihad is determined solely by the success or failure of jihadist 
propaganda on the Web. It simply means that there are factors that limit the success of 
jihadist information on the Web, despite the emergence of new technological tools and 
virtual spaces, and there are factors that achieve jihadi goals in matters of Web-based 
propaganda. 
  
1 Unless noted otherwise, in this work the word “jihad” refers to the violent or non-violent struggle of 
individuals associated with al Qaeda or its proxies around the world, or relative sympathizers, attempting to 
realize and promote the objectives mentioned by Osama bin Laden in his declarations in 1996  in the 
“Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places” and in 1998 in 
the “World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders.” 
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B. STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND SCOPE 
The objective of this thesis is to determine the factors that contribute to the 
success and failure of jihadist information operations and strategies in the contemporary 
Internet environment. The thesis faces a well-known problem, which consists of the 
impossibility of providing a contained and representative statistical sample of the 
environment that has to be studied. The features of the Internet along with the spread of 
jihadist Web-content on the Web makes it extremely difficult to study a representative 
sample of jihadist information operations and then submit it to qualitative and, especially, 
quantitative analysis. In this thesis we try to overcome this problem by selecting a 
contained sample, which is provided by depicting characteristics of jihadi information 
operations developed for a specific audience, the Albanian language speakers. The 
singularity of the Albanian language merges the perpetrators with the perpetrated 
audience, and provides a well-contained sample in analyzing characteristics of jihadi 
information operations on social networking sites. Through the collection and analysis of 
jihadi information content and networks developed within the Internet we will identify 
factors of success and failure of jihadist information operations on the Internet, and 
especially in the social networking sites. The methodology offered through this thesis 
may also provide an analytical model for understanding the jihadist Web-based 
propaganda, conducting research, and countering jihadist enterprises in this environment 
by exploiting opportunities presented to counter terrorist forces. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There have been several attempts to study jihadist Internet strategies2 and there is 
a lot of research going on for providing security agencies with technological products that 
make data from social networking sites easier to analyze. Given the difficulty of 
extracting representative samples or analyzing the whole Web in order to analyze the 
effectiveness of jihadist propaganda, most of the studies conducted have a descriptive 
2 The term Jihadi Internet strategies, in this study, stands for the organized efforts to conduct 
operations in order to achieve the objectives of the jihad. Further on, jihadi information operations will 
stand for the combination of means and resources offered by the Internet to forward to the public the 
messages in accordance with the jihadi narratives.  
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profile rather than an analytical one. Bunt (2003) underlines the difficulties in 
determining location and timing of the upload of online information by users, and the 
global dimension of propagation of information and introduces the term e-jihad for 
describing the jihadist Web-based information flow (pp. 25–28). Despite the difficulties 
there are some attempts that offer some logical explanations supported by limited data 
sets. 
Janbeck and Prado (2012) conducted research between 2009 and 2010 in an 
attempt to analyze the discursive strategies and representations of virtual communities of 
a few dozen terrorist-related websites. They agreed with the general assertion that the 
Internet is used by terrorists to disseminate propaganda, organize the membership, 
communicate information, fundraise, and recruit new members (p. 23), and provide 
documented argumentation of that. Despite the limited number of websites they analyzed, 
they noted that none of these websites offered interactive content, such as chat rooms, 
forums, etc. They explained this lack of service as a cautious choice by terrorists, in order 
to maintain tight control of the discourse over the Web. Nonetheless, the websites were 
interconnected with other similar content websites (p. 24). The research conducted by 
Janbeck and Prado (2012) is a model that offers insights within a restricted area. 
Although they analyzed only websites, and not any other Internet sources or platforms, 
their format may be used for analyzing also social networking site profiles or pages. 
Another way of conducting social networking analysis is proposed by Weisburd 
(2012), who proposes an “artisanal approach” model. His artisanal approach consists of 
an individual approach to track and analyze the imprint of suspected terrorists in social 
networking sites, without any specific agenda, just willingness to follow any traces of 
suspected profiles. However, he limits the effectiveness of this approach solely to 
individuals who may alert investigators by explicitly showing online the extremist side of 
their identity, or by being members of dark networks on the Web.  
Everton (2012) recognizes the emergent importance of social media and the 
potential of a proper study of them (p. 70) while assessing that the techniques of 
collection and processing of data are in their infancy (p.71). In fact, the tools available for 
the study of social networking sites consist of computer programs able to track, collect, 
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and process the data gathered through social networking sites or through the Web. These 
programs enable researchers or investigators to find and structure data, but do not provide 
further qualitative analysis, which is left to the human operator. The data structuring and 
the resulting analysis itself is also dependent on human assumptions, which are often 
based on factors deriving from incomplete researches on the jihadis’ use of the Internet 
al.so, another risk of automatic collection and data-structuring programs may be the 
leaving behind of important information. Despite that, raw data needs explanations and 
proper coding. Following the collection of data and the structuring of it, the biggest 
problem for the human operator is to give them the meaning that they have in the real 
world.  
To date, there is no method or data-driven approach to determine why some 
jihadist information operations are successful and others are not. This thesis overcomes 
this problem by depicting a specific sample within the jihadist information operations. 
The sample will consist of jihadist information operations in social networking sites in 
the Albanian language. The Albanian language is a quite old and unique language that is 
spoken by the Albanian population in Albania, Kosovo, Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia (FYROM) and Montenegro, or by Albanian populations living in other 
countries. Albanians have an interesting relation with religion and especially with Islam. 
It is reported that roughly 60% of the population is Muslim, but the “mosquegoers” and 
practicing believers are only a small minority of the Albanian population in Albania. In 
Kosovo, FYROM, and Montenegro the situation is different, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively, since religion has been an important part of the Albanian ethnic group in 
those countries, and the practicing of Islam is more relevant among the population. Since 
the fall of communism, the entire region has been under constant radical Islamic and 
jihadist propaganda, which is being transmitted mostly through the Internet. Despite a 
few cases when jihadi activists on the Web have been detected and indicted by security 
forces, still there is a strong presence of radical Islamist content on the Web, with a 
higher concentration in social networking sites. The language serves as a useful limiting 
factor (Sageman, 2004, p. 162) in building a consistent sample of jihadist propaganda, 
and it is quite easy to be searched and tracked in the social networking sites. After 
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building a dataset from the analysis of the jihadi content in Albania(n), we will use 
descriptive statistics, social network analysis, and visual analytics techniques to 
determine factors that contribute to the success or failure of jihadist information 
operations. 
D. THEORY 
Evaluating the success of jihadi information operations on the Internet and 
specifically on social networking sites is not an easy task. Previous (and partial) 
approaches to this problem have consisted of attempts to give answers to questions such 
as: How are they conducted? How do they exploit the Internet? What is their role in 
terrorist activities? (Janbeck and Prado, 2012). Other approaches are related to finding 
ways of getting information about these operations (Everton, 2012), or even monitoring 
these operations for obtaining information about previous, ongoing, on future terrorist 
activities (Weisburd, 2012). Most of the literature on jihadi information operations on the 
Internet and their exploitation for the disruption of terrorist networks is related to one of 
the mentioned approaches, while there is no significant study that adopts an exhaustive 
analytic approach in answering the questions: Why do some of them succeed, and why do 
some others fail? We will use four indicators or elements for evaluating the success (and 
failure) of jihadi information operations on the Internet. These elements are built upon the 
recommendations of prominent jihadi leaders on how to exploit the media to advance the 
goals of the jihad.  
The first element consists in guaranteeing the issuing of jihadi communications on 
multiple occasions and also ensuring that the message reaches wide audiences. The 
concept behind this element can be noticed in the recommendations of every prominent 
jihadi ideologue. If jihadi information operations are repeated and they reach a large 
audience, the chances of influencing individuals toward joining the jihad or supporting 
the cause increase, and thus the jihadi information operations achieve success.  
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The second element consists in making the jihadi information operations a 
networked effort. Prominent jihadis recommend that the spread of the call to jihad should 
be a common effort and each Muslim should contribute individually. In this case, if jihadi 
information operations are supported by various entities the chances for success increase; 
thus, the operations achieve success.  
The third element consists of tailoring jihadi information operations to meet the 
expectations of the specific audience. If jihadi information operations take into account a 
local audience’s narratives and characteristics, and they are tailored to include as little 
information that is extraneous to that audience as possible, the chances to achieve success 
increase.  
The fourth element consists of the exploitation of the opportunities offered by 
Web media in terms of audiovisual manipulation of messages. If jihadi information 
operations are forwarded to the audience through high quality media productions, 
guaranteeing that both the voice and images of the message are delivered at their best, 
they would increase their chances of success.   
These elements, in this form, may provide researchers and analysts with a 
theoretical explanation of the factors of success of jihadi information operations, but in 
order to be used for analytical purposes they need to be operationalized. The 
operationalization of these elements is done through a process that takes into account the 
current developments and opportunities offered by the Internet.  
E. METHODOLOGY 
While there are several authors who have conducted research on the operational 
use of the Internet by jihadist users, there is no significant study that approaches a 
quantitative manner for answering the following questions: Why do some information 
operations on the Internet succeed, and why do some others fail? Which jihadi 
information operations have potential for success? What plays a role in their success or 
failure? This lack of research is connected to the difficulties of extracting a contained 
sample from the Internet. We plan to overcome this problem by analyzing jihadi Internet 
information operations in the Albanian language. The Albanian language acts as a strong 
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limiting factor in influencing the Albanian population, and all the jihadi content in 
Albanian on the Internet aims exclusively to influence this population, since there is no 
other nation or community of people in the world that speaks and understands it. So, the 
first step to answer the research question posed in this thesis lies in fixing the problem of 
the identification of the research sample. The most important question that arises regards 
the feasibility of the claim: Is the Albanian case feasible? Evidence on the jihadi 
“enterprise” in Albania, Kosovo, and FYROM, where most of the ethnic Albanian 
population lives, is used to answer this question. The physical presence of jihadist 
activities in the region, despite the lack of any substantial or large-scale attacks, further 
supports the claim that the Albanian case can provide us with an effective research 
sample.  
Further on, the other issue that will be addressed consists of explaining the nexus 
between the jihad-”on the ground” and the jihad-”on the Web” operations. The question 
to be asked is put as follows: Should the jihadi-related content on the Web be considered 
part of the “real” jihad? In answering this question evidence collected from sources 
throughout the bibliography, and most important, from the publicly available scriptures 
of well-known jihadis, are used. In addition, we analyze the viewpoints of prominent 
jihadis regarding the necessity to spread information about the jihad, and also their 
relative recommendations on how do that successfully. The most important source, 
though, would be the writings of Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, the al Qaeda strategist, who has 
contributed on these matters in his “Call to Global Islamic Resistance” (Lacey, 2008). Al-
Suri was apprehended in late 2005, so his guidelines are related to that stage of 
development of Internet technology and infrastructure, but that does not mean they are 
not relevant, since other jihadis have picked his idea up and elaborated on them further.  
The other issue considered in this study is related to the opportunities and 
challenges of the Internet, as the ultimate playground of jihadis, but also a fertile field for 
counterterrorist subjects. From 2005 to the present date the Internet infrastructure, and its 
public usage, have changed immensely, and the emergence of social networking sites has 
also definitely changed how these opposing parties interact with it.  
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Still, the theoretical assumptions of the success and failure of jihadist information 
operations on the Internet cannot fulfill the research objectives. Therefore, the next step is 
to analyze the “sample.” For this step, data is collected by running searches with 
keywords and following links that lead to jihadi content “Webspaces” and building a 
dataset. This kind of research follows the model proposed by Weisburd (2012). The 
search is run on the biggest social networking sites that are used in Albania. As found in 
Alexa, the leading provider of free Web metrics, the most visited social networking sites 
in Albania are Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. The research approaches Facebook and 
YouTube, while the data is going to be collected from the later. 
After identifying and collecting the data we structure them in standardized 
spreadsheets in order to use them for further analysis. The data sets are coded as per the 
social networking sites available information, including: links, usernames, number of 
viewers, number of responses and responders’ usernames, likes, number of videos, time 
of upload, threads, articles, etc. Since the Albanian language is made of only two major 
dialects, which are used in different geographical areas of the country and the region, we 
also identify and collect information regarding which dialect is used by the users, and 
conduct geo-spatial analysis as well when possible. The data collected through the 
research is submitted to a semantic analysis in order to confront the data quantitatively 
with the major objectives promoted by notorious jihadists, such as bin Laden, al-Suri, and 
others.  
The buildup of the dataset will enable statistical analysis, regression analysis, and 
basic social network analysis. 
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II. THE EVOLUTION OF THE INTERNET AND ITS EFFECTS 
ON THE WEB-BASED JIHAD 
 “Abuthaabit: This media work, I am telling you, is very important. Very, 
very, very, very.” 
 “Irhabi007: I know, I know.” 
 “Abuthaabit: Because a lot of the funds brothers are getting is because 
they are seeing stuff like this coming out. Imagine how many people have 
gone (to Iraq) after seeing the situation because of the videos. Imagine 
how many of them could have been shaheed as well.”  
–Extract from an interdicted communication between an 
anonymous cyber-jihadis, Abuthaabit, and the Englishman, 
Younis Tsouli, Irhabi007, one of the most prolific cyber-
jihadists until being arrested by the British police forces in 
November 2006 (The Economist, 2007). 
 
A. THE PHASES OF THE INTERNET EVOLUTION 
The Internet provides a meaningful number of opportunities for exploiting its 
applications to the user’s benefit. From its emergence to the present the Internet has 
changed drastically. Its evolution is divided in two main subsequent phases. The first, 
which may be called the phase of the “traditional Internet,” includes the period from the 
start of the use of the Internet by the wider public until the year 2005, when the first 
social networking sites appeared. The second phase will include the “modern Internet” 
and includes the period from 2005 to the present. A common pattern that characterizes 
both phases is the increasing number of Internet users, while a distinguishing 
characteristic is the way in which the Internet users can use it. In the phase of the 
traditional Internet the ways in which the Internet users approached the Web were limited 
to simple actions, mainly through the passive use of its applications, such as surfing the 
Web, emailing, or exchanging viewpoints through simply built forums. Since 2005, with 
the appearance of YouTube, and later on of Facebook, and other more recent 
applications, the users could significantly change the way they made use of the Internet. 
Beside the traditional uses, the modern Internet users can communicate more easily in 
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different ways that include audio-visual improvements, networking, and user-built 
websites. Users can access and use these features which are free and do not require any 
particular skill. The modern phase is also characterized by an exponential increase in the 
number of Internet users, given the global technological advancement. The global 
Internet penetration in 2012 was nearly 35% of the world population, while there is a 
large variation in the penetration range between regions of the world. In the second 
phase, even remote areas of the world, that were previously excluded from the Internet 
benefits, are now connected into the Web. 
B. JIHADIS AND THEIR PUBLIC IMAGE 
Two of the main characteristics of the Internet are its lack of barriers and speed of 
communication and the high level of anonymity that it provides to the general user. These 
characteristics have made the Internet a preferred tool for Islamist terrorists. There is 
extensive literature on the uses of the Internet by terrorists. As Weimann3 (2006) puts it, 
terrorists may use the Web in two ways: first, as a communication tool between 
themselves and potential supporters to spread information, propaganda, instructions, in 
other words as an information network; second, as a virtual battlefield, engaging in what 
is known as cyber-terrorism (p. 25). The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) (2012) identifies six different categories of activities for which the terrorists 
use Internet: propaganda, financing, training, planning, execution, and cyber attacks (p. 
3). Weimann and Von Knop (2007) go into more detail and list the following activities: 
psychological warfare, online indoctrination, recruitment and mobilization, planning and 
coordination, fund-raising, data mining, and disinformation (p. 886). 
This study considers these activities from a general perspective, with the purpose 
of noticing the differences over time rather than analyzing each case thoroughly. 
  
3 Weimann (2009) also reports that the Internet is also used to conduct ideological debates and various 
disputes within jihadis or other Islamist organizations. (p. 49) He brings different examples such as the 
critiques between al Qaeda vs. Hamas, al Qaeda vs. Hezbollah, and Sunnis vs. Shi’as, debates within those 
groups, or even personal disputes between the jihadi leadership. (p. 50–72) 
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In showing the evolution of the terrorist’s use of the Internet over time, and 
especially through the two phases mentioned above, it is fundamental to identify the 
reasons behind the instauration of the strong relationship between terrorists and the 
Internet.  
Throughout modern history, terrorist groups have resorted to terrorism from a 
position of weakness in front of their enemies. To succeed in their struggle, terrorists 
need publicity. Juergensmeyer (2000) maintains that terrorism is strongly connected with 
the publicity it generates, and that without it, terrorism would cease to exist (p. 139). The 
need for (positive) publicity makes terrorists choose their targets carefully. The target to 
be attacked is determined by the amount of publicity it would attract, not its intrinsic 
value. Symbolism is more appealing than the direct effect. In this way, terrorist attacks fit 
the media needs for sparkling audiovisual services, and also attract sympathizers to the 
terrorist’s cause (Kepel and Milelli, 2005, p. 29). The terrorists’ success is not only 
defined in matters of political achievements against the government or governments in 
the case of international terrorist groups, but also in terms of recruiting and logistical 
support, which are strongly connected with the publicity that surrounds the terrorist 
group. Referring to the case of Al Qaeda, Kepel and Milelli express that it exists only in a 
“cathode mode,” and that all its operations are dependent on the media space that the 
group can occupy and especially the type of media that offers more spectacle. From this 
perspective the technological development and especially the modernization of the media 
environment in the world have helped bin Laden’s initiative succeed, to the degree that it 
was dependent on the publicity. Given the poor Internet expansion in bin Laden’s initial 
“area of responsibility,” the Arabic peninsula and to a lesser extent the whole Islamic 
world, his main source of publicity was the Arabic and international television channels. 
The emergence and the sooner dominance of the Arab transnational media, led by Al 
Jazeera, in the Arabic peninsula gave a powerful impetus to the jihad, in the way it was 
advanced by Al Qaeda. The jihadist terrorist organization was eager to integrate itself 
with the new media (p. 27). In regard to bin Laden’s videotapes aired by TV stations, 
Tuman (2003) expresses “the bin Laden tapes, while shot in a style suggesting an 
amateur working with a simple video camera, were actually fairly sophisticated rhetorical 
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artifacts” (p. 137). After the terrorist attacks in Kenya and Tanzania, Bin Laden himself 
was particularly cautious with his media profile.  
Bin Laden invented a policy tailored to video clips and ads; brief speeches 
that were easily incorporated into prime-time news; carefully designed, 
simple settings; and straightforward speeches, devoid of affectation or 
sophistication. (Tuman, 2003, p. 28) 
The public was appealed to for the whole jihadi struggle from a central point, 
which was bin Laden. In his short appearances, Bin Laden himself looks more like an 
object for display, a man of few words, but appealing to the masses. The CNN journalist, 
Peter Bergen (2001), who interviewed bin Laden in the late 1990s, recalls the caution of 
bin Laden during the interview. In a less personal environment, Al Qaeda’s practice of 
releasing videos of bin Laden, first to Al Jazeera, to have them aired and later to be 
retransmitted from other Western stations, is explained by a careful management of the 
media profile of the organization leader but also of the organization itself. The bin Laden 
terrorist attacks were arranged to exploit  the media opportunities fully. They were 
attempting to trigger the “mechanical cause-and-effect cycle of attack,” (p. 28) which was 
professed by Carlos Marighella. As Kepel and Milelli (2005) maintain further on: 
Bin Laden’s movement used some of these (Marighella’s) themes, but did 
not make them its main motive. It (Bin Laden’s way of doing things) was 
based not on a particular strategy that adherents worked hard to follow, 
but on a specific relationship with the media. This was imposed in part by 
its way of functioning, its targets, and its scope. (p. 28) 
Al Qaeda wanted to be sure that the Arab public was going to see the video 
message, then any other public of the world (Tuman, 2003, p. 140), since its narrative 
was concentrated mostly on the Arabic peninsula, and also logistical support and recruits 
originated from the area, despite the primary enemy being the Western governments, 
especially the United States. The message contained, even though appealing to 
Westerners, was to be shown at first to the Easterners.  
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C. TERRORISM AS A COMMUNICATION PROCESS 
Tuman (2003) analyzes terrorism as a communication process, which involves the 
terrorists, as senders, and the target audience, as receivers. The act of terrorism, more 
than that the message encoded with it, is the message sent from terrorists to the target 
audience. Tuman maintains that the target audience decodes the message by relying upon 
the methods and tools it has for constructing its own sense of reality (p. 18). The target 
audience determines also the choice of the media used for the propagation of the message 
by the terrorists. In the case of Al Qaeda, throughout the 1990s until 2001, the TV 
channels were the main channels of communication between the organization and the 
public. The call for jihad was especially appealing to the youth, who are characteristically 
attracted by the flamboyant and inspiring images rather than the ideological content of Al 
Qaeda’s jihad. Al Qaeda “used abundant audiovisual, as opposed to ideological 
references, which have an impact on a young Arab audience that owes its education to 
television rather than to the crumbling educational system” (Kepel and Milelli, 2005, p. 
29). The observations on the exploitation of audio-visual effects to report the jihadist 
activities for propaganda purposes are valuable also for the later exploitation of Internet 
space by Al Qaeda.  
Still, during this period there is no significant presence of the jihadist on the Web, 
and the number of jihadi websites amounts to only a dozen by the end of the 1990s. The 
lack of significant presence on the Internet by Al Qaeda was due, first, to the lack of its 
target public on this platform, and second, because of its relative freedom to make use of 
the traditional media, which did fill further empty spaces, left by the TV channels. Along 
with TV appearances the jihadi enterprise also used to publish magazines or leaflets that 
were distributed in printed editions (Awan, 2011).  
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D. WEB-BASED JIHADISM IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11: 
OPPORTUNITIES  
The 9/11 attacks on U.S. soil would change dramatically how Al Qaeda managed 
to communicate its messages, not only between itself and the wider public, but also 
within the organization. The change did not make Al Qaeda stop sending videocassettes 
or compact diskettes to Arab TV, but it made the organization meet the Internet in the 
widest way and shortest time possible. Bunt (2003) gives a definition of the use of the 
Internet by Islamist users and the environment that they create in the Web. “Cyber 
Islamic Environments have the potential to transform aspects of religious understanding 
and expression within Muslim contexts, and the power to enable elements within Muslim 
populations in minority and majority arenas to dialogue (not necessary amicably) with 
each other” (p. 4). 
After the invasion of Afghanistan by U.S. and coalition forces, al Qaeda’s 
information operations went almost entirely online, due to the military pressure and 
attendant physical dangers. The only exclusions were the occasional distribution of 
videocassettes to Arab TV, but they only showed the Al Qaeda leadership, in a type of 
“show-the-flag” manner rather than spreading strategic propaganda, which started to flow 
quite freely on the Web. It is important to recognize that the meeting between terrorists 
and the Internet, in the case of Al Qaeda was more forced and spontaneous rather than 
natural or well planned by the jihadi leadership. Sageman (2008) also defines the 
interaction between terrorists and the Internet as a spontaneous one, caused by the 
simultaneous growth of the Internet and the physical pressure of governmental forces in 
the real world toward terrorist groups or individuals (p. 110). Sageman would recognize 
two roles that are played by the Internet in terrorism. The first, which is the passive role, 
makes the Internet a provider of information related to terrorism. This first role of the 
Internet is similar to the role the traditional media played or continued to play after the 
9/11. The second role of the Internet was the active role, which consisted of making the 
Internet a system of communication between individuals and between individuals and 
groups. Sageman identifies the second role of the Internet as revolutionary (p. 114). 
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By embracing the Internet for their information operations the jihadis overcame a 
few problems but they started to face others. The first problem they had to overcome is 
related to their quite secure operational environment, compared to that of an open 
information campaign on the ground. The second problem they had to overcome is the 
break of their ties with the traditional media. Combs identifies the goals of the terrorists 
in relation to the media, the government in relation to the media, and the media itself in 
relation to terrorism (Table 1). The relationships are based on interdependency, and it can 
be maintained that this type of traditional approach may not fulfill in full the terrorists’ 
informational objectives.  
 
Terrorist goals and the 
media 
Government goals and 
the media 
Media goals related to 
terrorism 
Use the media to acquire 
“free” publicity. 
Gain publicity to 
government efforts against 
terrorists. 
Get a scoop. 
Media reports that offer a 
favorable understanding of 
the terrorist cause. 
Make the media focus on 
the designation of terrorists 
as “the bad boys.” 
Present the news 
dramatically and timely. 
Gain legitimacy and 
identity through the media 
reports. 
Deny terrorists a platform 
through the media. 
Protect the right of the 
people to get informed. 
Generating a sense of 
unrest through media 
information dissemination. 
Make the media share the 
information and cooperate 
with the government. 
Secure its employees. 
Table 1.   Terrorists, the government, and the media (from Combs, 2006, p. 169). 
From another perspective about the terrorist approach toward the Internet, given 
the absence of any censure, relative higher security, and the timesaving, comes to be 
more useful to the terrorists’ needs. At the same time, the traditional media can only 
publicize only a few types of messages, and not become an informational outlet for 
recruiting, indoctrination or fundraising, such as the Internet does.  
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E. WEB-BASED JIHADISM IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11: PROBLEMS 
FROM WITHIN 
Beside the benefits from the new interaction, the jihadi enterprise faced problems 
related to the management of the jihadi information campaign on the Web, and also with 
security-related issues.  
With regard to management problems, the jihadi style of conducting information 
operations did not fit entirely with the reality faced on the Internet. The high leadership of 
Al Qaeda was not prepared for the hierarchy-less model of operation on the Internet. 
Both bin Laden and Al-Zawahiri, the leaders of the jihad movement, believed in a 
centralized management of the information struggle. Kepel and Milelli (2005) maintain 
that bin Laden’s plan when he created the World Islamic Front for Jihad against Jews and 
Crusaders, on February 23, 1998, was to exploit the absence of a central power in 
Afghanistan and organize dispersed jihadists in a single coalition (p. 22). Also his way of 
exposing himself to the traditional media suggests that the uncontrolled spread of jihadi 
information on the Internet was not his style of operation. Ayman al-Zawahiri in his 
“Knights under the Prophet’s banner” (Kepel and Milelli, 2005, pp. 193–205) expresses, 
“The jihad movement must dedicate itself to working with the masses, preaching in the 
community, providing services to the Muslim people, and sharing their concerns through 
all available avenues for charity and educational work.” Further on he maintains, “The 
jihad movement must enter the battle in midst of the community and lead it to the 
battlefield. It must guard against isolating itself from its community in an elitist battle 
against the authorities” (p.196). Zawahiri recognizes cases when the jihad movement has 
failed to communicate clearly with the public, and he believes that the Muslims are going 
to join the jihad movement only if the mujahedeen’s slogans are comprehensible (p. 197). 
In matters of achieving the support of masses in waging jihad, Al-Zawahiri recognizes 
three important elements that are necessary: a leadership that they can trust, follow, and 
understand; a clear enemy to strike at; and courage and willingness.  
We must communicate our message to the masses and break the media 
embargo imposed on the jihad movement. (p. 204) 
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Al-Zawahiri’s thought on the model to follow in waging jihad is clearly 
centralized and hierarchical. Sageman (2008) maintains that “the Internet egalitarianism 
undermined the hierarchy of traditional terrorist organizations” (p. 118). He writes: 
Traditional leaders can post suggestions in chat rooms, but it is up to the 
followers to pick and choose among them and follow whatever they like. 
In this sense, it is similar to a marketplace of ideas. The leaders have no 
way of enforcing their commands on the Internet, as would have been the 
case in offline organizations, through incentives like funding or 
intimidation. (p. 120) 
Also the Ayatollah Khomeini, from a Shia perspective, professes the centralized 
model of organizing jihad. Khomeini (in Salemson, 1985) indicates that the propaganda 
for Islamic purposes shall be organized through a centralized organization:  
Once a few people sit down together, think matters out together, make 
decisions, it follows that propaganda will emerge. Then little by little 
others who think the same way are attracted to the group and it increases 
in size. (p. 20) 
The centralized model sustained by the elder jihadis is challenged by the younger 
generation of jihadi ideologues. Abu Mus’ab al-Suri4 makes the main critique to the 
centralized model, and introduces what has taken the name of “leaderless jihad.” Al-Suri 
in his Call to Global Islamic Resistance (in Lacey, 2008) recognizes as fundamental the 
role of indoctrination and awareness within the Muslim community in order to succeed in 
the jihad. The indoctrination and awareness building shall not follow under a centralized 
campaign. He maintains that “the armed jihad does not arise from vacuum and will not 
transform into the desired magnitude until a revolutionary jihadist climate exits to give 
rise to it” (p. 6). In order to create the jihadist climate, the jihadists must rely on 
nonfighting fields, such as the dissemination of ideas and creeds through media and 
traditional places of gathering such as mosques, schools, etc. (p. 7). He delineates three 
levels of personal resistance that any Muslim should go through in order to join the jihad 
movement: first, the Islamic religious sentiment, connected with natural reactions over 
injustice; second, the will to fight, which is formed after the individual is informed about 
4 His real name is Mustafa bin Abd al-Qadir Setmariam Nasar. He is also known as Umar Abd al-
Hakim. Abu-Mus’ab al-Suri, according to Brachman (2006), is the chief architect of the jihadism over the 
Internet (p. 159). 
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destructiveness caused by the enemy; and third, the jihadist creed, which is aroused only 
through proper education and instruction, before the individual joins the movement (p. 8). 
In relation to the media exploitation and the incitement to join the jihad Al-Suri 
(in Lacey, 2008) provides detailed recommendations with the purpose of encouraging 
creativity in their free propagation. He suggests that the style of the jihadis’ message 
should be “lucid, streamlined, cogent, passionate and inspiring, to combine not only the 
promise of victory and rewards but also Allah’s beneficence and grace for attempting to 
face foreign enemies and his retribution for dereliction and delinquency” (p. 191). Al-
Suri, puts an emphasis on Internet exploitation and identifies it as a “powerful engine for 
communicating with the public at large” (p.192). The Internet, to Al-Suri, is also an 
inexpensive tool, which may overcome the difficulties associated with the spread of the 
call for jihad by traditional media.  
Al-Suri, in making his recommendations in regard to the building of messages, 
mentions the necessity of tailoring the content of the message to the right caste of the 
society at which it is directed (p. 192). In addition to these fundamental recommendations 
he provides a list of possible inspiring topics, which may serve as grassroots to the jihadi 
movement call. The topics suggested by Al-Suri are: the Qur’anic textual material that 
brings to the fore the theme of combat and jihad, the body of fatwas that deal with the 
religious obligation to jihad and the self-defense clauses, narratives from the Prophet’s 
biography, provocative war stories of the past that incite jihad, emphasizing the Crusade 
expeditions and identifying similarities with the actual situation, the Muslim reaction to 
the Crusades and the destruction brought by the crusaders, emphasizing the modern-day 
conspiracies against the Islamic world, highlighting the role of current colonization 
helped by members of the Islamic world, highlighting the Jewish-Zionist actions toward 
Muslims in Palestine, highlighting the American actions toward Muslims, emphasize the 
role of martyrs, publication of all literature related to resistance, etc. He directly suggests 
the use of the Internet for the dissemination of these messages, but does not limit the 
recommendations only to the dissemination for the persuasion of Muslims to join the 
jihad movement, but also calls for the use of Internet to reach enemies and threaten them 
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by using it. Further on he recommends, for the preservation of secrecy and security, using 
the Internet (pp. 192–196).  
Al-Suri is the most prolific jihadi ideologue in matters of jihadi propaganda and 
information operations, although as Hegghammer notes (2013), his works appear on 
jihadi forums on the Internet less often than the writings of other jihadists who are not as 
prolific as he is on jihadi operations. Still, he remains the source of the only well-
structured project on how to conduct the leaderless jihad. Al-Suri advocates for the 
restructuring of jihadi groups, from the centralized structure of the tanzimat, to 
decentralized self-sufficient cells acting independently. In this way, the jihad would be 
held by “phantom organizations” (Lia, 2008, p. 6). In his words, warfare must be 
conducted under the basic operating system and slogan:  “system, not organization” (Al-
Suri, n.d.). The structure behind this idea is composed of three departments operating in 
accordance but without any control from each other. The first department, or the “Central 
Detachment,” is composed by the individual leading the battle in the fronts of war. The 
second department, or the “Non-central Detachments,” is a form of structure composed 
by individuals who are assigned to leave the Central Detachment in order to spread in 
their relative countries and educate secretly recruits for the jihad. The third department, 
or the “Common Detachments of the Global Islamic Resistance Call,” is a form of 
structure composed by enthusiastic youths who join the jihad and promote it to others. 
Al-Suri recognizes that the conditions are not met for the establishment of effective 
Common Detachments by the direct oversight of the first two detachments, due to the 
pressure on the ground. He calls for organizing efforts into the establishment and 
operationalization of the first two departments, which must be done by the current jihadi 
leadership. From the other side, he provides guidance for the creation of Common 
Detachments by free will of jihadis throughout the world. Under this guidance is 
advanced the project of the composition of a similar detachment.  
The Common Detachment as thought of by al-Suri may be composed by 
specialized sub-detachments: the Recruiters Detachment, the Operational Detachment, 
and the Covert Incitement Detachments. When describing the Covert Incitement 
Detachments al-Suri mentions that members of this detachment must have “media 
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experience,” be Internet and electronic communications savvy. The mission of these 
individuals would be the spread of the Call to resistance and to spread its content through 
traditional means, but especially through the Internet al.-Suri also recommends that the 
media campaign should be careful on forwarding communications and “rely on the 
situation of every place and country.” Al-Suri has written also a separate chapter entitled 
“The theory of media and incitement,” which is supposed to provide guidance to Covert 
Incitement Detachments, but that chapter is not made public to the date. Al-Suri calls for 
a separation of operation-focused detachments and recruiting and inciting focused 
detachments, since any relationship between these two types of detachments may result 
in the disruption of those by security forces. From the other side, recruiters and inciters, 
as al-Suri portrays them, should be individuals highly skilled in related affairs. Also a 
recruiter “must be able to affect a wide circle of people.” 
Another supporter of the leaderless jihad and an advocate of the Internet jihad is 
also Anwar al-Awlaki.5 In his “44 Ways To Support Jihad,” he asserts that the most can 
be realized through the use of Internet tools. One of the ways that the American jihadi 
suggests to the eventual supporters of jihad is explicitly the “www jihad” and his 
recommendation is directed to what he calls the “Internet mujahedeen” brothers and 
sisters, who should support jihad by promoting and extending the jihad propaganda 
through the Web. Al-Awlaki’s  “44 Ways To Support Jihad” calls for the spread of 
jihadi-related information among the wider public by establishing Internet media outlets, 
but he does not provide any detailed strategy on how to do that, as al-Suri does.  
Rogan (2007) analyzes the perspectives on the importance of the media campaign 
of Osama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, Abu Mus’ab al-Suri, Abu Ubaid al-Qurashi, 
Abu Bakr Naji, Sayf al-Adl, Abu Hudhaifa, and Ibn Ahmad al-Salim. The last is the 
author of a document that appeared on the Web in 2003, entitled “39 Ways To Serve and 
Participate in Jihad.” Al-Salim, as Rogan reports, advances a way of operation for 
promoting jihad, which consists of the engagement of cells of two individuals, the first 
5 Born as Anwar bin Nasser bin Abdulla al-Aulaqi, in New Mexico, U.S.A., and killed by a U.S. 
unmanned aerial vehicle in Yemen in 2011. 
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uploading content on the Web and the second commenting and stimulating the 
participation of the public (p. 34). 
The recommendations put forward by jihadi prominent ideologues are quite 
similar in terms of defining goals and means, but a well-defined strategy is missing. That 
leaves ample space for self-initiative in dealing with the spread of the call to jihad, by 
other jihadis and sympathizers. The evolution of the Internet has also contributed to the 
diversification of the strategies which are used by the latter to promote jihadism on the 
Web. 
F. WEB-BASED JIHADISM IN THE AFTERMATH OF 9/11: PROBLEMS 
FROM OUTSIDE 
Beside the structural problems related to the Internet’s exploitation within the 
jihadi movement, the jihadi-Internet relationship is affected by problems that are related 
to operational security. Heghammer (2013) identifies three types of problems within the 
jihadis use of the Internet: security of communications, the increasing lack of trust, and 
the saturation of the Web, which makes impossible the spread of the right information. In 
regard to the first problem, jihadis have to make a silent compromise: if they want their 
information campaign to survive on the Internet they have to keep a low profile and 
attract a small number of sympathizers. Popular jihadi websites become objects of 
interest to law enforcement agencies targeting them and sooner or later they are cracked 
down. As Sageman (2004) maintains, a “too great reliance on the new technology” makes 
the network more vulnerable to monitoring and disruption (p. 159). But beside the cases 
of disruption of these websites or the few cases when Internet activists have been 
arrested, the greatest achievement of law enforcement agencies is the installation of fear 
within jihadi websites. The main reason why jihadis moved to Internet was its secure 
environment for communication, and the paranoia of losing this fundamental factor 
decreases their abilities to interconnect. Arquilla and Rondfeldt (2009) maintain, “If our 
enemies came to see cyberspace as insecure, they would probably flee the virtual 
domain” (p.63). Hegghammer also has conducted research on this issue, and he has 
noticed the rising lack of trust within jihadi forums (2013). The issue of saturation with 
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jihadi content materials is also a problem created by the lack of a centralized control on 
the jihadi information flow on the Internet.  
Sageman (2004) brings up some other limitations to the success of jihad through 
the Internet: first, the accessibility, then the reliability, and finally, the lack of a common 
language between jihadis (p. 162). Most of the previously mentioned problems that 
jihadis faced in the first phase of the Internet evolution were inherited in the second phase 
of the Internet’s evolution, when the social networking sites started to appear.  
G. JIHADISM IN THE TWO EVOLUTIONARY PHASES OF THE 
INTERNET 
In the traditional Internet phase, the jihadist propaganda was mainly conducted 
through simple Web pages (forums or Web logs), and communications were mostly 
conducted through mailing lists. The jihadist narrative was preserved and controlled 
through centralized virtual infrastructures. Despite the unlimited spread of these websites, 
due to the nondiscriminatory nature of the Internet, conducting an effective propaganda 
campaign represented several difficulties. First, websites needed publicity to attract more 
potential sympathizers, and when achieving a high visibility they incurred the risk of 
being monitored or shut down by security agencies. Second, due to technological 
requisites, a jihadist Web manager needed funds to keep the website running and 
advanced technical capabilities to cover his virtual activity. Also the audio-visual quality 
of the jihadi media was very poor. The situation changed with the technological 
improvement of the Web infrastructure and the emergence of the social networking sites. 
The emergence of You Tube, Facebook (Mitra, 2010, p. 101), and other free applications 
on the Internet enables jihadists to increase the quantity and the quality of their 
communications with the public. Winn and Zakem (2009) report that some of the 
technological developments that have given rise to Web 2.0 applications include: 
increased bandwidth, improved tools for posting content, digitalization of technology, the 
Internet penetration, advances in social networking, and capitalization of the Internet” (p. 
29). Weimann (2009) monitored the jihadi presence on the Internet in those years, and as 
he reports, the websites serving terrorists’ purposes did increase exponentially: in the late 
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1990s there were a dozen, by 2000 all terrorist groups had websites, by 2003 there were 
2600, and by 2007 there were over 5800 websites.  
The technological potential of the new Internet environment was the leading 
reason of the “revival” of the jihadi movement on the Internet. After those developments 
the Internet users could create their own brand of Internet content and make that available 
to the whole network within seconds. YouTube, as a platform for user-generated content, 
became the most successful platform for communicating by text and picture aspects of 
terrorism, which had been never available before, in such short time. The awareness 
building campaign and the recruitment initiatives were made easier through the use of 
powerful audio-visual messages. The possibility of supporting the call to jihad with 
videos, audio messages, and pictures from the battlefield gave a new impetus to the 
Internet jihad. The influence of the public reached by the jihadi propaganda is supposed 
to have been easier. Forest and Honkus (2009) observe the influence of communication, 
noting, “An ideology does not have to be based on fact to be believed; it merely needs to 
be communicated effectively and persuasively within a favorable cultural, 
socioeconomic, and political environment which can enable ideological resonance” (p. 
5). By contrast, the nature of the new Internet environment made networking easier. 
Winn and Zakem (2009) maintain that the current environment makes it particularly easy 
“to create extremist communities within an existing network because of the nature of 
these sites is highly decentralized and the massive membership makes surveillance nearly 
impossible” (p. 35). As a result the Web 2.0 applications became used widely by terrorist 
groups, or their sympathizers, everywhere. Nevertheless social networking sites did not 
replace traditional sites such as forums and blogs, but as posited by Winn and Zakem 
(2009), they added “a more amorphous dimension to these movements’ anatomy” (p. 37). 
But, the question that arises is how did these changes affect the traditional problems that 
jihadis faced on the Internet in the previous phase? 
With regard to the structural management of the jihadi propaganda, the emergence 
of the Web 2.0 significantly changed the way in which jihadis dealt with their 
management problem. Conway (2012) recalling the Al Qaeda case gives two reasons for 
the change. The first was the impossibility of Al Qaeda’s centralized structures to 
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exercise control over the jihadist narrative. An important event illustrating this problem 
was the appearance of Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi on the Web with his famous videos, one 
of which showed him decapitating the American Nicholas Berg (p.13). Winn and Zakem 
(2009) maintain that Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi’s decision to expose the horrors of combat 
to the wider public was a strategy of his own, rather than just a display of his will to 
decapitate enemies (p. 32). Unfortunately Al-Zarqawi’s actions did not contribute to the 
jihadi narrative, and his actions were criticized openly also by other jihadis. 
The second reason lies in the technological development and the emergence of 
new social networking platforms in the Internet landscape, such as Facebook and 
YouTube, which diversified the ways of transmission and representation of the 
information (p. 14). Still, the jihadi information operations on the Web remained 
primarily leaderless, with al-Zarqawi being the most independent jihadi overall, but there 
was an attempt to reduce the confusion in the spread of jihadi materials. Since, the Al 
Qaeda leadership could not centralize the spread of the jihadi ideology on the Web, it 
tried to brand the media it divulgated on the Internet. Several jihadi media companies 
populated the Web with branded materials. Often these materials were jihadi videos 
containing a logo or different script containing various signatures. In fact, Lia (2007) 
maintains that the rise of Web media companies should be seen as a response to the need 
for branding, to facilitate the easy identification of authentic jihadi media products (p. 6). 
Lia recognizes significant improvements brought by these companies in the online jihad. 
From his research on jihadi Web media production companies he notes that those 
companies: produced more material, and of a better audiovisual quality, than the past 
companies; they are subordinated to a less hierarchical command structure; as a result of 
the second characteristic they speak with a more autonomous voice than the earlier; and 
they tend to network and separate the labor within themselves. The rise of the jihadi Web 
media production companies (such as the Islamic Media Center, Al-Sahab, Global 
Islamic Media Front, Al-Fajr, Labayka, al-Furqan, etc.) is also linked with the violent 
crackdown on the most popular extremist websites, which has made jihadists restructure 
their Web activities (p. 2). 
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Over the past ten years, Jihadism Online has expanded quickly, in terms of 
both quality and quantity. It is also evolving rapidly. It appears to have 
become more resilient and capable of expanding its presence despite 
countermeasures. We should expect it to become more interactive, as well 
as sleeker in layout and design. There will be a greater variety of formats 
and improved access from a larger variety of portable electronic devices. 
Violent Islamist websites will also become increasingly multi-lingual (p. 
3). 
Also Hegghammer (2010) mentions a few developments in the online exposure of 
the jihad in the recent years: the first, the growth of high-quality audiovisuals 
propaganda; second, the spread of jihadi propaganda in languages other than Arabic; 
third, an increasing presence of jihadi propaganda on mainstream media platforms, 
especially on YouTube. Hegghammer puts an emphasis on the third development since it 
enables jihadists to exploit more effectively the Internet opportunities, such as its 
interconnectivity, to the benefit of their cause.  
Despite the innovation introduced by these media companies they faced all the 
problems connected with centralized structures. They were exposed and faced the 
repression of law enforcement agencies. The al-Sahab media production company, a 
direct subordinate to Al Qaeda, operated under the direction of the son-in-law of al 
Zawahiri, Abdul Rehman al-Maghrebi, and after his supposed death by an air attack in 
2007, the al-Sahab decreased its Web imprint exponentially. The same happened to the 
Global Islamic Media Front (GIMF), a European enterprise of Internet jihadis. Its activity 
online was disrupted as the German police arrested the members of the initiative in the 
period 2008‒2010. Beside the crackdown on the leaders of these organizations, these 
companies have left a significant number of jihadi content spread about on the Web. 
Also, the techniques adopted by these companies were appropriated by independent 
jihadis that still upload “branded” materials on the Web. One of the surviving enterprises 
is the Ansar Al-Mujahideen Forum, which offers jihadi materials in several languages 
and of an excellent audio-visual quality.  
Keeping in mind the current technological improvements and the increased 
quantity of jihadi ideological materials on the Web, the question that is posed is, will the 
jihadis succeed in increasing recruitment and raise the awareness on their struggle?   
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Given the current trends this seems quite impossible. Almost a decade after the 
emergence of the social networking sites and the increase of the world population’s 
access to the Internet, there has been no significant achievement of the jihad, as it was 
evoked by Osama bin Laden and his followers in the late 1990s. This does not mean that 
jihadi information operations have failed, or the overall success of the jihad is determined 
solely by the success or failure of jihadist propaganda on the Web. Sageman (2004) 
maintains, “For the type of allegiance that the jihad demands, there is no evidence that 
the Internet is persuasive enough by itself” (p. 127). He recalls previous research 
conducted by Lofland and Stark, in relation to the process of conversion of individuals to 
jihadis. The process of conversion (of an individual), as Lofland and Stark determine it 
(in Sageman, 2004, pp. 126–127), follows seven steps, in which three elements are 
general background factors, consisting of: (1) the experience in enduring, acutely felt 
tensions, (2) within a religious problem-solving perspective, (3) which leads him to 
define himself as religious seeker; and the following four, that Sageman determines as 
situational factors dependent on timing: (4)encountering the Divine Principle at a turning 
point at his life, (5) wherein an effective bond is formed with one or more converts, (6) 
where extra-cult attachments are absent or neutralized, and, (7) where, if he is to become 
a deployable agent, he is exposed to intensive interaction (p. 126). The processes that are 
described previously are difficult to be evoked simply by contact with the Internet, 
despite its role in helping the radicalization of certain parts within the public. Sageman 
(2004) maintains that joining the jihad is actually a process and not a single decision (p. 
91). Moreover, Sageman, adds that “the notion of recruitment implies an active process 
through which an organizational insider gets a new person to work for the  
organization (p. 121). These types of interactions are more difficult to be verified given 
the high levels of the lack of trust within the Internet communicative platforms.  
The Internet jihad may seem to be in its glory days, if evaluated from the quantity 
of the jihadi outlets of materials, or their respective quality, but the real struggle on the 
ground is facing huge problems. Most of the leaders of Al Qaeda have been eliminated 
and the remaining ones are on the run, which has made it difficult to conduct the 
information-jihad in an organized manner. Beside Al Suri’s recommendations for an 
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effective leaderless jihad, there is still much confusion on the Internet and on the ground. 
Sageman (2004) writes on the limitations of the leaderless social movements:  
To survive, it requires a constant stream of new violent actions to hold the 
interest of potential newcomers to the movement, create the impression of 
visible progress toward a goal, and give potential recruits a vicarious 
experience before they take the initiative to engage in their own terrorist 
activities. (p. 145) 
Further on, Sageman recognizes another limitation to the leaderless jihad, the 
impossibility to impose discipline, which is fundamental in the survival of such a 
movement. 
Other important factors that affect the jihadi use of the new Internet applications, 
known as social networking sites, are related to the flow of the audience in those sites and 
the use of these sites for networking among jihadis. As the first factor suggests jihadis 
tend to use social networking sites because of the quantity of users of those applications. 
YouTube, Facebook, and Twitter are ranked in the top 15 most visited websites in the 
world (Alexa, 2013). Facebook is ranked second and its penetration, even in areas of the 
world with low Internet penetration rates, is very high. In contrast, YouTube provides an 
excellent tool for the spread of high quality audio-visual content and allows users to 
receive feedback and also share materials. The use of social networking websites by 
jihadis is emphasized in the related literature. Sageman (2008), in describing the 
historical development of interactions within terrorist networks identifies two stages: the 
first one, taking place until 2004, presupposes the building of terrorist networks as a 
consequence of face-to-face meetings; the second, from 2004 onward, presupposes the 
creation of networks and the build-up of inspirations toward terrorism through Internet 
interactions (p. 109). Everton (2012) recognizes the emergent importance of social media 
and the potential of a proper study of them (p. 70) while assessing that the techniques of 
collection and processing of data are in their infancy (p. 71).  
In fact, the tools available for the study of social networking sites consist of 
computer programs able to track, collect, and process the data gathered through social 
networking sites or through the Web. In fact, social networking sites do not help jihadis 
more than traditional websites do. Issues related to the lack of trust persist also in social 
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networking sites and the overall operational security in social networking sites is lower 
than in traditional websites. The first factor that contributes to the diminishing of the 
operational security is the higher chance of disruption of the networks by security forces. 
By subscribing to social networking sites, jihadis and their sympathizers enter in a 
defined and monitored database. In the case of Facebook, every member of the network 
appears with his chosen name by a simple search, and even if this user wants to keep a 
low profile and unsubscribe from the option to show his profile in search engines, it is 
quite easy for the database managers to monitor his or his group’s activities within the 
network. Another factor that diminishes the operational security level of social 
networking site users is exactly the networking. In traditional websites the network is 
centered on the website. Each of the users is connected with other users; let them be also 
agent provocateurs; through the website, the forum, Web log, or anything similar. In case 
of the disruption of the network it is harder to identify all the endpoints. But, in the case 
of social networking sites the users interconnect with each other individually and they 
form a social network with a high number of nodes. The nodes can be identified easily in 
case of suspicious activities by one member of the network and the following discovery 
of it.  
So, what makes jihadis use social networking sites? The answer relies on the 
massive presence of Internet users in the networking sites, with Facebook and YouTube 
leading the game. Since September 2012, Facebook has more than 1 billion users and is 
the second most-visited website after Google. It is followed by YouTube with 800 
million unique visitors each month, and the third most-visited website globally. 
Surprisingly, the flow of Internet users to social networking sites worries also prominent 
jihadis. Bunzel (2013) discusses an essay written by a jihadi ideologue, Abu Sa’d al-
’Amili, on the state of online global jihad. Al-’Amili laments the general decline of the 
participation in jihadi online forums, which he finds as proper centers of jihadi 
discussion. The jihadi ideologue criticizes former forum users for lack of loyalty toward 
the jihadi forums. He tries to identify the reasons behind the flagging interest in jihadi 
forums and numbers several of them, which are: the periodic disruptions by Western law 
enforcement agencies, the increasing fear of monitoring and tracking by them, the 
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departure of jihadi members to join the jihad in Syria, the migration of forum users to 
Facebook and Twitter (he recalls that the usage of Facebook and Twitter was a 
consequence of the disruption of jihadi forums), a general withdrawal due to the lack of 
attention on the threads written by forum members. Al-’Amili also identifies a few steps 
for reinvigorating the forums, one of which is to abandon the social networking sites, 
such as Facebook and Twitter, because they being run by enemies. While Al-’Amili 
criticizes the abandonment of jihadi forums in favor of social networking sites, he himself 
resorted to having a Twitter account according to Bunzel. Beside the observations of Al-
’Amili, social networking sites represent an efficient way of exploiting the evolution of 
the Internet to the benefit of social movements. The social networking sites have been 
used extensively in the Arab Spring events (Petit, 2012). Hezbollah and al-Shabab have 
official Twitter accounts through which they communicate their declarations to their 
affiliates and the general public.  
Of particular interest in matters of the evolution of networking technologies usage 
by terrorists is a RAND report from 2007, which was developed under the auspices of the 
Department of Homeland Security. It conducted research on the potential application of 
information and communication technologies that may be used across the full range of 
activities that make up terrorist operations and whether these applications can lead to new 
and different approaches to terrorist operations (in Don, 2007, p. xiii). The RAND 
analysts came up with three hypothetical strategies that would be adopted by terrorists in 
matters of obtaining and using network technologies: the first, terrorists would obtain and 
use network technologies by investing in them, in pursuit of a significant effect on attack 
outcomes or perhaps operational efficiency; second, terrorists would rely on versatile 
technologies or pursue a wide variety of individual technologies, with moderate 
expectations on this approach to network technologies; and third, terrorists would use 
technology opportunistically, with the expectation that technology will only contribute to 
attack outcomes and operational efficiency in minor ways.  
The assessment of these expectations of terrorists, as RAND’s analysts suggest, 
will be made by terrorists based on the benefits these choices might confer, such as the 
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increase of the organization’s ability to carry out strategic activities such as recruiting and 
training, or improvement of the outcome of terrorist attacks (p. xv). 
The conclusions of the RAND study were as follows: 
• Future network technologies are most likely to result in real but modest 
improvement in overall terrorist group efficiency but not dramatic 
improvements in their operational outcomes. 
• Terrorists will most likely acquire network technologies for the versatility 
and variety that they offer and will use them to enhance the efficiency and 
effectiveness of their supporting activities. 
• Attempting to preclude terrorists from getting the types of technology they 
want will not be practical, and developing direct counters to them will 
unlikely yield a high payoff. 
• Exploitation seems the more promising option for governments. 
• Even though there do not appear to be any network technologies that offer 
revolutionary capabilities in the immediate future, security services need 
to monitor the development of technologies in the event that such a 
capability emerges. (pp. xvi-xvii) 
Based on the RAND report conclusions on the use of social networking 
technologies, we can drive our own conclusions on how security forces may deal with the 
terrorist use of the new Internet environment in the future.  
The current trends show an increasing rate of Internet penetration in all areas of 
the world, which will provide to terrorists new spaces to conduct their information 
operations through the use of the Internet. The governments should exploit all the 
possible areas where terrorists fail to achieve perfection. The government’s action should 
focus on the periodic monitoring of and crackdown on jihadi Web spaces, but also 
conduct Web-based information operations in order to counter the jihadi radicalization 
strategies, and also undermine jihadi sympathizers’ trust when participating in radical 
forums.  
The objective of governmental agencies should be not to eradicate the jihadi 
websites of forums, but rather to monitor them and deter potential users from using them. 
As Gray (2003, p. 461) states, terrorism falls when it runs out of psychological, social, 
and political steam.  
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III. OPPORTUNITIES, CHALLENGES, AND LIMITS OF THE 
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN COUNTERING TERRORISM 
ON THE INTERNET 
A. POSSIBLE SCENARIOS OF INTERNET CONTROL 
The Internet is an important source of information that serves Intelligence 
Community (IC) purposes and needs. The object of information collection by intelligence 
agencies may be different as well, ranging from the non-secretive collection of open data 
to the collection of data protected by property and privacy rights, or even data protected 
by government secrecy laws, as in the case of exploitation of cyber-attacks to obtain 
information from foreign government bodies. One can list as many reasons as possible, 
but we will focus on the collection and use of data sourcing from the Internet that may 
serve the IC in countering terrorism. Here let us distinguish two main purposes connected 
with IC actions toward combating terrorism, the first dealing with prevention, and the 
second dealing with the suppression and targeting of terrorist activities and terrorists. 
Further on, we analyze three possible and available scenarios in which the IC operates in 
attempting to exploit the Internet in countering terrorism: let the first scenario be 
characterized by an absolute dominance of the Internet “terrain” by intelligence bodies; 
let the second scenario be characterized by a contained dominance of the Internet by 
intelligence bodies; and let the third scenario be characterized by a strictly limited, 
minimal or absent control of the information flow on the Internet by intelligence bodies. 
The question that arises and which we attempt to answer is: what are the opportunities, 
challenges, and limits of the collection and analysis of information by intelligence 
operators in countering terrorism in each of the scenarios described earlier? 
B. THE “NO” CONTROL SCENARIO 
As a starting point we begin with the scenario in which there is limited, minimal, 
or no control of the information flow on the Internet by the IC. This situation may also be 
a result of the lack of Internet penetration in the society, but also a result of the incapacity 
of governmental or non-governmental agencies to exploit the Internet for the benefit of 
counterterrorist efforts. Usually these conditions are met and coexist together. Using 
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statistics from the Internet World Stats (2013), in which both Asia and Africa rank below 
the world average in Internet penetration, the 2012 data results show 34.3%, or simply 
one out of three individuals, is connected to the Internet. The Internet penetration into 
society is a very important factor in determining the approach of local intelligence 
communities to this field. Of course, if no one is connected to the Internet there would be 
no data to collect and exploit. But, this assertion is becoming less and less feasible, since 
Internet usage and penetration is growing very quickly all over the world. Anyway, the 
penetration of Internet services or connection to a population is not the only determinant 
factor in making the Internet a domain of terrorists. The security set up of the country, or 
region, and also the law enforcement levels and legislation are very important factors of 
“how much and what” can be found out there. At this point let us return to the purposes 
of the IC. The prevention of terrorism, as it is referred to here, consists of depriving the 
terrorists of publicity, public and political reach, and also mass communication. The 
actions here may include information operations, deception strategies, disruption of 
information channels etc., on the Internet.  
Now let us project these strategies to our scenario and evaluate the opportunities 
offered by the Internet. Since it serves primarily as a mass communication tool, a low 
penetration rate reduces the success of communication campaigns, measured in the 
number of reached users. The same may be said for the effectiveness, measured in 
reached and radicalized users. In contrast, the same cannot be said for the breadth of 
communication and sophistication used. Independent of Internet penetration on a certain 
population, if terrorists operate in that area they may use the same applications on the 
Internet that are found anywhere else. There are no limitations on this perspective, and 
the terrorists may exploit using the most sophisticated techniques in forwarding their 
political messages. Still, it may turn out to be a waste of resources for them, since the 
objective is to radicalize more people and in this scenario only a limited number of 
people has Internet connectivity. 
From the perspective of the IC operating in this scenario, and the assumption that 
its capabilities to counter this dimension of terrorist operations are limited, it does not 
mean that the contest is lost. Reasonably, the terrorist ideology spreading on the Internet 
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is proportional to the extension of the Internet itself, but the situation differs with the 
depth of terrorist engagement. Terrorists may engage in extensive and sophisticated 
communication campaigns, and perhaps achieve some success. From the IC perspective, 
there are plenty of ways to obtain information and conduct counter-operations, given the 
limitations set by Internet penetration on the population. Its effects may be noticed early 
by “traditional” methods or by monitoring the physical dimension of potentially 
radicalizing centers. The simple monitoring of radicalizing materials on the Internet can 
also be made without sophisticated technologies or software, which by our assumption, 
the IC in that region lacks. Since the goal of the IC community is the prevention of the 
“publicity” spread by the terrorists, the issue needs definition. There is a wide consensus 
among scholars about the necessity of publicity from the terrorists’ side, which helps 
them in recruiting more individuals to the cause, strengthens their political stance, and 
attracts sponsors.  
All this, of course, cannot be achieved effectively through secret chat rooms, 
encrypted Web pages, or other Internet tools. Terrorists and affiliates looking for 
publicity for the cause have to trade their “Internet operational security” in order to 
spread messages. This “operational security” in our case does not necessarily guarantee 
information about the messenger but certainly provides all the information necessary 
about the message itself. To make it clearer, let us consider the example of a You Tube 
user, who may be affiliated with an Islamic radical organization. He may make use of 
You Tube options by opening an account by a different name and disclose no real 
information at all, and after doing that he may post or share videos or other Internet 
content that promote terrorism with the wider community of the Internet. A non-
sophisticated IC, as in our case, may not obtain any information at all about the identity 
of the user, but all the videos or other posts of him are easily accessible, and along with 
that also plenty of information about the reached community. You Tube provides data 
about the number of views of a video, number of likes and dislikes, a temporal graph 
showing the performance of the public reach of the video, comments left by other users, 
etc. Apart from the information provided for free from You Tube, other contextual, 
linguistic, and relational analysis is available. The IC can obtain data about the message 
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that the organization wants to forward to the public and act toward countering the 
organization’s activity by exploiting the data obtained by analyzing its messages. You 
Tube was used as an example not only because it is a preferred tool for terrorist 
organizations and their affiliates to spread messages both with voice and images, but also 
as an Internet application, which is a powerful representative of the new environment on 
the Internet, characterized by the emergence of social networking sites, such as You Tube 
itself, Facebook, My Space, Twitter, etc.  
The powerful graphics, excellent outreach, and high adaptability make the social 
networking sites a preferred channel for terrorists to communicate with the public. Beside 
the benefits, these Internet applications also reduce the possibility of terrorist 
organizations and their affiliates keeping a low public profile. Still, the terrorists sacrifice 
their operational security in matters of information campaigns for public exposure, 
primarily because they need the public, and consequently they choose social media 
because that is where everybody can be found more than anywhere else on the Internet. 
In the world ranking of websites provided by Alexa, Facebook and YouTube rank 
respectively in first and third place, while Twitter, Windows Live, and Blogspot, stay 
within the top 15 Internet sites most visited in the world. The power of social media to 
attract both the general public, and possible recruits or sympathizers of terrorism, is 
recognized also by the radical and terrorist preachers on the Internet. In an Internet 
posting written by a jihadi ideologue named Abu Sa’d al-’Amili, the state of the online 
global jihad is described (Bunzel, 2013). The ideologue laments the general decline of the 
participation in jihadi online forums, which are thought to be more exclusive, and 
consequently more efficient in his opinion. In identifying the reasons behind the flagging 
interest in jihadi forums he mentions the migration of the forum’s users to Facebook and 
Twitter.  
From this point let us pass on the other purposes of the IC, which are the 
suppression and the targeting of terrorists by exploiting Internet data. In the focused 
scenario, where the IC has very limited capabilities to monitor and control the flow of 
data on the Internet, the terrorists may have an advantage especially in regard to 
operational security and communication. The capability of contrasting electronic 
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communications and especially Internet communications requires highly capable 
intelligence operators and costly devices and software, the cost of which cannot be 
sustained by most of the countries or ICs of the world. Intelligence sharing and 
cooperation may be a solution but still, given these types of resources and technologies, 
countries and agencies who own them are reluctant to provide unlimited support and 
access to countries and agencies who do not. Nevertheless, in the current scenario, the 
action against terrorism does not depend only on the technologies which make possible 
advanced tracking of Internet communications and data, or break passwords of closed 
forums, emails and accounts of suspicious Internet users. The IC community in this 
scenario may also make assessments and analyze open data, as described in the previous 
step, which could determine the steps to take in shaping an effective counterterrorist 
strategy. In contrast, the inability to read terrorists’ messages does not necessarily mean 
an intelligence failure, and not even a terrorist success over the security establishment. To 
advance in their struggle terrorists need to act, and act in a way that influences most of 
the entire community and its government; otherwise, they fail. The “hard talk” needs 
resources and people, which in the given scenario cannot be procured simply by writing 
an email or debating in a forum.  
Beside the chances of being monitored by the IC, and subsequently tracked and 
eliminated, terrorists face other problems in using the Internet for their purposes. First, as 
Sageman mentions (2008, p. 110) the terrorists have become familiar with the Internet 
and continue to use it because of pressure from the governmental forces in the real world. 
This relationship is a forced consequence, not a choice or preference. Second, 
independent of the level of sophistication of the security forces, terrorists do not have an 
easy path in using the Internet. Problems related to the lack of trust and operational 
management on the Internet negatively affect the terrorists’ efforts to advance their cause 
(See Heghammer, 2013; Sageman, 2004, p. 159; Arquilla and Rondfeldt, 2009, p. 63). 
C. THE “FAIR” CONTROL SCENARIO 
The next scenarios share most of the characteristics analyzed in the first one. This 
is because the root problems remain the same and also because the second scenario 
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consequently follows the first scenario. In the case when the IC has a contained control 
over the Internet, in terms of technical capabilities, it is necessary to mention some 
distinguishing features in comparison with the first scenario. In this scenario it is assumed 
that Internet penetration and usage are at satisfactory levels from the side of the 
population, and from the side of the IC (and security forces), there is a developed 
capacity in tracking, monitoring, and targeting terrorists operating on the Internet. This 
scenario may well reflect the situation in most of the developed world, and especially in 
the countries of the Western hemisphere. From a terrorist’s perspective, the Internet is 
used for a wide array of purposes: internal communication, publicity, recruiting, 
fundraising, etc., by actors involved in terrorism: hard core members, supporters, and also 
sympathizers. In the case of prevention measures, here the situation is more complicated 
than in the first scenario. The complication derives from the amount of information that 
already exists and the information that is projected continuously often reproduced and 
shared widely by the whole array of terrorists and their supporters and sympathizers, 
throughout the Web. Here it is necessary to distinguish opportunities and difficulties that 
the IC faces in preventing terrorism, as well as the opportunities and problems that the 
terrorists and their affiliated individuals face in their efforts to forward their cause 
through the Internet.  
Also, the opportunity of one group is the benefit of the other. Starting with the 
terrorists, the opportunities that are presented to them relate to the benefits of the Internet 
as a free mass media, but also to the lack of extensive capabilities of the IC to counter 
terrorism on the Internet, which will be explained later. The problems relate both to the 
lack of trust in the online communication, given the effective disruption of  terrorist 
websites and the infiltration of intelligence operators into the Web forums hosting 
terrorists and their affiliates, and the nature of the current Internet environment. As 
mentioned before, social networking sites are being extensively used for spreading 
terrorism-related information and also for communication in a higher audio-visual quality 
than ever. But the nature of these sites, and also the higher Internet penetration rates and 
Internet usage guarantees no secrecy at all, which discourages both terrorists and possible 
recruits from using common Internet outlets. Another problem is the publicity that is 
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attired by the open-Web networks as they become more numerous, in terms of followers 
and diversification in terms of content. Once the network of sympathizers increases, the 
risk of ending up targeted by the IC becomes imminent. In this case, terrorists not only 
risk damaging their operational security on the Internet but also have to sacrifice the 
dimension of their outreach if they want their network to be safe enough. Another 
problem that the terrorists have to worry about is the selectivity of the public. With higher 
Internet penetration and usage rates the public becomes more selective and reasonable in 
believing the terrorists’ narrative.  
Conversely, the opportunities that are presented to the IC relate to the 
technological advantage that security forces have in comparison to the terrorist 
organizations. By increasing their data monitoring and processing capabilities the IC has 
more advantages in countering the information campaigns of the terrorists. Still, these 
capabilities are far from perfect. Here start the problems. First, despite the sophisticated 
technologies and methods in use nowadays, the IC does not have a clear picture of the 
terrorist efforts. This is not possible since there is still a large percentage of population, 
including terrorists or affiliates, that do not make use of the Internet at all, and who often 
do not even make use of traceable technology, such as mobile phones or other devices. 
From this perspective traditional methods of intelligence gathering drive the efforts. 
Traditional methods and Internet-based models of intelligence gathering should be 
understood as being complementary, not exclusive of each other. Second, the 
technological advantage in processing terrorism-related data is limited to national IC 
while terrorists often operate especially through the Internet internationally. This problem 
does not only follow national borders but also “agency” borders. The diversification of 
the intelligence gathering and processing bodies makes the analysis and interpretation of 
the data collected more diversified, which may lead to a sort of “Rashomon” effect, but 
also redundance. Third, the technological capabilities of the IC in this scenario do not 
enable definitive collection and analysis of the Internet-sourced data.  
The collection of data through the Internet is made either manually, or by 
software that searches and collects by the use of keywords. The manual collection leaves 
room for a lot of subjectivity, but the same might be said of the automatized methods. 
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Keyword searches have limitations, since linguistic diversities may affect the collection 
and further on also the analysis of the data. The processes of manipulation and 
interpretation of the data may result in difficulties as well. The problem in dealing with 
the data collected through these techniques is connected also with the difficulty in 
recognizing and separating the important from the unimportant information. The lack of a 
model or a defined characteristic of the information to be retrieved costs the IC a lot of 
time and resources. 
The same problems are reflected in the efforts for the suppression and targeting of 
terrorists by using their imprints retrieved from the information on the Internet. Given the 
assumed characteristics of the scenario, the IC has an advantage when it succeeds in 
identifying its target traces on the Internet. By tracking identified terrorists’ steps on the 
Internet or the virtual world, the physical location and targeting of the individual is an 
easier process than in the first scenario. Still, this is a final step. The problem consists not 
only of identifying the “important” traces, but also the important “players.” Since there is 
a wider public connected to the Internet, it becomes harder to distinguish the sympathizer 
who keeps posting and sharing Al Qaeda’s videos on You Tube, from the recruiter, or the 
operative who will blow up a city bus the next day. Other limits derive from a legislative 
point of view. Human rights, freedom of expression, and other civil rights make it harder 
for the security forces to suppress every single radical viewpoint that exists on the 
Internet. 
D. THE “TOTAL” CONTROL SCENARIO 
The next scenario is a very futuristic one, but it shall not be excluded from this 
kind of analysis. In the case where the IC has an absolute dominance over Internet 
information flow, the only limit that the IC might have would be the limits that it would 
put on itself. An establishment of this kind is a problem itself. Nonetheless, the IC may 
achieve full benefits from this dominance only if there is total Internet penetration and 
usage by the population. This means that everybody would be connected to the Internet 
and everybody would make use of it for every single purpose, terrorist purposes included. 
This looks quite unrealistic, since the moment that the terrorists know that they are being 
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tracked they would cease to conduct their business through that tool. Arquilla and 
Ronfeldt (2009) maintain the same, “If our enemies came to see cyberspace as insecure, 
they would probably flee the virtual domain” (p. 63). In this case, there is no distinction 
between prevention and targeting of terrorism. Even rejecting the Internet would not be a 
solution for terrorists since that may also be interpreted as a suspicious act. The problem 
does not lie only on what is already inside the Internet, but also what is not, as 
Troianovski and Siobhan (2013) report. The issue as reported here is related more to 
force and operations-related information protection, rather than an issue of reactive and 
proactive behavior toward counter-government forces. As said before, this situation is 
more imaginary rather than realistic, even if possible in the near future.  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, countering terrorism on the Internet presents both opportunities and 
difficulties for the IC. The subjective, manual, and case-by-case evaluation approach in 
analyzing terrorism-related information deriving from the Internet, and the objective, 
automatically retrieved and processed data approach may be useful if used separately, but 
a comprehensive approach may be more effective, especially in a scenario when the IC 
has a contained control over the Internet information flow. An important fact to think 
about is that terrorists make use of the Internet as a consequence of their suppression in 
the real world, and the IC may make it possible to keep the Internet as the terrorists’ last 
stronghold, rather than as their second choice.  
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IV. THE NATURE OF THE JIHADI ENTERPRISE IN THE 
BALKANS: THE ALBANIAN CASE 
A. A SHORT BACKGROUND 
The sudden fall of communism and the events that shaped the transition of Balkan 
states from autocratic regimes to more liberal ones allowed several Islamic factions 
engaged in terrorism to conduct their “business” in those countries, especially the ones 
that had a strong presence of Muslim communities. The case of Albania and the 
surrounding countries makes a perfect example to show how terrorist entities approached 
the Balkans and what counterterrorism measures were taken by the governments. This 
chapter assesses the terrorist “enterprise” in Albania and in the neighboring countries 
where people of Albanian nationality live. Basically, it answers the following questions: 
Why and how did foreign terrorists enter Albania, and in the Balkans in general? What 
was their activity in the country and in the region? How were those foreign terrorist 
groups disrupted? Finally, what did they leave behind that may be of concern to security 
forces of the Balkan countries? 
Before explaining how foreign Islamic terrorists reached the Balkans, it is 
important to mention that a substantial part of the Balkans population is Muslim, and that 
they practice a very liberal form of Islam, which is very different from how Islam is 
practiced in the countries from which the foreign terrorists came. The liberal form of 
Islam practiced in the Balkans is due to the reasons connected with the introduction of 
Islam to the Balkans (by the Ottoman invasion), the development of it under the Hanafi 
school of thought, and the presence of various Sufi sects, among others the Bektasi sect, 
which is more widespread in Albania. (See Appendix A for statistical data about religions 
in the Balkans.) The political stance that the regimes of the Balkan states took toward 
religion, mostly by marginalizing it, also had an important effect on the way  religion is 
practiced in the Balkan countries. 
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In the case of Albania, religious activities and manifestations have been banned 
since 1967 during the communist regime, after being considered incompatible with the 
atheist character of the country’s political ideology. After the fall of communism in 
Albania, the law that banned religions was abolished, and that led to the creation of 
respective religious communities, such as the Albanian Muslim Community (AMC), led 
by former (before the abolishment) clerics.  
B. THE EMERGENCE OF FOREIGN RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE 
Along with the religious “revival” managed by national institutions, many foreign 
religious organizations rushed to play a role on their own. In regard to the Islamic 
engagement, several Islamic organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and 
charities, started to establish their presence in the country. The main reason for the 
sudden attention of these Islamic organizations toward Albania was the Muslim heritage 
of the country. At the time there were only a few statistical data on the religion of 
Albanians within the Albanian state. According to a 1930 census, within the population 
of 1,003,124 souls, 69% were declared Muslims, 21% were declared Christian Orthodox, 
and 10% were declared Roman Catholic, while only 347 citizens did not declare their 
religion (Epstein, 1938, pp. 685–690). The 1930 census remained the only statistical 
source on religion in Albania for many years, and probably these percentages inspired the 
Arab donors to begin sending funds to Albania in the early 1990s. In 2011 the Albanian 
government conducted the first census on the religious identity of Albanian citizens since 
1930. (The inclusion of questions about religion was denounced publicly by several 
political and public society organizations, considering the attempt as outrage violation of 
human rights, followed by an invitation to the citizens to reject answering the related 
questions.) 
As those organizations emerged in the country, they noticed the lack of qualified 
religious leaders to drive the revival of Islam, and their immediate solution was to take an 
active role to address this issue. The lack of properly qualified religious leaders was 
recognized as a problem in regard to the relative expansion of foreign influence in 
matters of religion, both in Albania and in Kosovo (ICG, 2001, p. 2; ICG, 2001a, p. 3). 
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This lack was exploited most recently by offering scholarships in Islamic studies to 
Albanian youth, while encouraging freelancers sympathetic to radical Islamic sects in 
offering religious services to the public, and by disseminating religious texts for free. A 
similar approach was verified in all Balkan countries, not only in Albania.  
Another factor that enabled terrorist entities to reach Albania was the permissive 
role of the authorities. The role of the governing authorities in this outbreak of Islamic 
entities in Albania was fundamental. The inability to attract Western aid and financing to 
the levels required for a normal transition made the Albanian authorities permissive and 
more receptive to the Islamic activities in Albania, despite the disagreements over these 
issues in the Parliament or in the public opinion (Deliso, 2007, p. 30). The pro-Islamic-
inflow nature of the government of Albania in the early 1990s is well known. Besides 
granting Albanian citizenship to a great number of foreign “investors” from Arab 
countries without any particular identity verification, during the years from 1992 to 1994, 
the story of the former intelligence services director, Bashkim Gazidede, gives further 
insights on the level of permissive conduct of the Albanian authorities in relation to 
Islamic enterprises wanting to establish a presence in Albania. Gazidede was appointed 
as a director of the National Information Service (NIS), the only intelligence agency in 
the country, immediately after the newly elected Democratic Party (DP) administration 
took office in 1992.  
Beside his official occupation, the head of the NIS, had strong personal 
relationships with most of the directors of the Islamic organizations operating in Albania 
and he was also appointed to the role of President of a newly-formed Albanian Islamic 
organization, the Islamic Intellectuals Association of Albania, funded by foreign Islamic 
charities. This welcoming environment was mainly due to the expectation of funding 
arriving from Islamic sources, and was characteristic of all Balkan countries. Given the 
permissive environment and a weak rule of law in those countries, most of the Islamic 
organizations entering the Balkans became a safe haven for individuals engaged in 
terrorism activities. Kittner (2007) defines terrorist safe havens as “geographical spaces 
where Islamist terrorists are able to successfully establish an organizational and 
operational base that may include, one, all or some of these activities: fundraising 
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(including money laundering, charities, criminal activities, drug trafficking, taxes on the 
population, etc.), communications network (for efficient command and control and 
intelligence gathering), operational space for training (and access to weapons and 
ammunitions), logistic network (to enable travel, the movement of money, the access to 
fraudulent document, etc.) (p. 308). Terrorist safe havens may emerge and develop under 
certain conditions. Kittner identifies several factors, including geographical features of a 
territory, weak governance, and spread of corruption, a violent past, and wealth 
conditions (p. 313). The eruption of internal conflicts, first in Bosnia (1992‒1995), then 
in Albania (1997), Kosovo (1998‒1999), and Macedonia (2001) and the spread of 
weapons and ammunitions made those countries more preferred for jihadi-type 
engagements. Kittner also maintains that “a state’s inability to adequately govern its 
citizens and administer its institutions reveals to Islamist terrorists uncontrollable 
territories that they can exploit” (p. 310).  
The most flagrant case of exploitation of internal problems to shelter terrorist 
groups was verified after the eruption of the Bosnian civil war in 1992, when up to 3000 
(some sources suggest a larger number, up to 6000) foreign fighters, declared as 
mujahedeen, fled to the country and formed military units and joined the Bosnian Army, 
in its fight against Serbian and Croatian paramilitary forces. When the war was over the 
Bosnian government faced huge problems in dealing with those individuals dispersed all 
over the country and conducting indiscriminate attacks. Nevertheless, the invitation was 
surprisingly official, coming from the Bosnian head of the state, President Alija 
Izetbegovic (ICG, 2001, p. 11), who was appointed as the honorary commander of the 
“El Mujaheed” unit, a military force made up entirely of foreign Muslim fighters who 
were officially part of the Seventh Muslim Brigade of the Third Corps of the Bosnian 
Army. The generosity of Izetbegovic went further in 1993, when he decided to provide 
all these individuals with the right of Bosnian citizenship. Given the tumultuous situation 
in Bosnia, there is little evidence of the process of distribution of passports to and 
documentation of these individuals. The Bosnian case differs from the Albanian case 
because of the open invitation to mujahedeen fighters by the Bosnian President, while in 
the case of Albania; the foreign terrorists infiltrated the Islamic organizations in the 
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country semi-covertly. Besides that, the personal relationships between political leaders 
and prominent foreign Islamic figures, the provision of official documentation and 
shelter, and also the way they practically reached the countries and got to get along are 
similar. The most active entities engaged in the “circulation” of foreign terrorists and 
extremists, and related funding in the Balkans were the Islamic NGOs. The funding of 
foreign charities operating in the Balkans came from wealthy Arabic countries, such as 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait etc.. Both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had governmental 
organizations, such as the Saudi Ministry of Islamic Affairs, for example (Johnson, 2007, 
p. 101), that were engaged in collecting and distributing the funds, but they were 
exercising less control on how the funds were used by NGOs operating outside their 
countries, especially in the pre-9/11 period.  
C. THE CHARITIES NETWORK 
From research attempting to analyze the spread of Islamic NGOs in the Balkans 
using data from contained sources,6 and by using visual analytics software, it is apparent 
that the Islamic NGOs operating in the Balkans were interconnected with each other. The 
connections were identified (coded) as the exchange of officials, exchange of funds, 
funding partnerships, or direction of funds to common terrorist organizations. Appendix 
B contains a number of data visualizations extracted from link analysis, geo-temporal 
analysis, and social network analysis (SNA) of the Islamic NGO organizations operating 
in the Balkans who have been identified as supporters of terrorism. An important detail 
that emerged from the research was the financial links between those organizations and 
terrorist organizations. The link between Islamic charities and terrorism activities 
financing is well known and analyzed in counterterrorism studies. As Lewitt and 
Jacobson (2008) report, charities engage in various ways in terrorist activities: 
fundraising, diverting the purpose of funds, creating fertile recruitment grounds, offering 
cover, and laundering money (p. 10). 
  
6 See the List of References. 
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Similar results were obtained from the social network analysis that was conducted 
for this thesis; the most interconnected terrorist organization (with Islamic NGOs 
operating in the early ‘90s in the Balkans) was al Qaeda. The links between al Qaeda and 
Islamic NGOs from a general perspective are well-described by Comras (2007): 
Al Qaeda established and infiltrated several international Muslim 
charities, using them to collect and mask their funds. These charities 
disbursed funds not only to legitimate humanitarian relief but also for Al 
Qaeda activities, including the establishment and maintenance of new, 
radical Islamic centers. These centers propagated a virulent theology and 
strong opposition to Western culture and values, and they provided Al 
Qaeda and other Salafist groups the means to undertake extensive 
worldwide indoctrination and recruitment activities. (pp. 115–116) 
The most active NGOs and charities operating in the Balkans and supporting 
terrorism were the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO, aka IGASA), the Al 
Haramain Foundation (AHF), the Global Relief Fund (GRF), the Taibah International 
(TI), the Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), the Third World Relief Agency 
(TWRA), and the Al-Furqan (AF). There is little evidence on the amounts of money they 
have circulated and provided for terrorist purposes given their dual purpose, but just to 
give an idea, the whole Bosnian mujahedeen were organized, had their travel paid for and 
they were maintained in the country for several years through the funds of the branches 
of these organizations in Bosnia. The cover of humanitarian activities has worked well 
for NGOs associated with terrorist organizations in the Balkans, since the region has been 
a hotbed for several conflicts and characterized by a lack of law enforcement, insufficient 
border security, corruption, and organized crime. Some of them existed only on paper as 
fictitious humanitarian NGOs in order to allow the flow of money from foreign accounts, 
but some others did conduct humanitarian activities by distributing goods and services to 
communities. Their terrorist engagement consisted in providing Islamic terrorists with 
false documents, easily procured either from the black market or by corrupt state 
officials, or by facilitating and funding terrorists’ travel throughout the region. 
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D. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS 
IN SUPPORTING TERRORISM IN ALBANIA 
Returning to the Albanian case, in 1990 the International Humanitarian Islamic 
Organization (IIRO) was the first Islamic charity to establish a presence in the country, 
and it engaged in the distribution of medical and relief supplies. Later on the AHF, the 
GRF, the BIF and the Revival of Islamic Heritage Society (RIHS) established their 
presence also. Along with religious and humanitarian non-governmental organizations, 
some financial organizations, like the Islamic Development Bank amongst others, 
motivated by the proclaimed Islamic heritage of Albanians and the eagerness of the 
Albanian government to develop relationships with the rich countries of the Arab world. 
They approached the country promising investments and funding for the reconstruction 
of its underdeveloped infrastructure. By 1994, there were two other major Islamic 
financial institutions in Albania, the Arab-Albanian Bank and the Malaysian Bank of 
Albania, along with several private companies having Arab owners, like the Caravan 
Construction Company of the Saudi Yasin Al-Qadi, the Saudi Cable Company, the 
Kuwaiti Mak-Albanian Construction Company.  
Kullolli (2009) recalls a U.S. Department of State report on human rights of 1997 
where the number of Islamic representatives in Albania amounted to 95. Most of these 
entities, took a financial approach in attracting Albanians, often donating to families 
monthly in order to keep them under their influence. Along the financial help, some of 
the charities provided scholarships for children of poor families, sending the students into 
the Gulf countries and elsewhere. The charities also funded the construction of new 
mosques and reconstruction of former ones (pp. 8–9). For some of them, the cover as 
charities and their social programs were both intended to profess an unknown and radical 
form of Islam to Albanians, and guarantee transnational jihadis a secure base and 
employment in order not to raise suspicions, despite the fragile law enforcement agencies 
of Albania. The most evident example regarding the activity of Islamic NGOs in Albania 
is brought by Vickers, recalling the case of Bulqiza, a mining town in Eastern Albania. 
The city’s population is extremely poor and the sole employment perspectives are the 
mining facilities, which run their business in a shadowy manner. This situation was 
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exploited by Taibah International, which started to pay members of the Bektasi 
community of the town to convert to Sunni Islam. Scholarships for their children were 
also offered.  
On another occasion, the organization invited and hosted a dozen foreign men, 
who were referred to by locals as “Taliban” because of their long beards and short 
trousers (p. 9). Similar cases include those of Prrenjas, Qafe Thanë, and Peshkopi, all tiny 
towns with high unemployment rates. Yasin Al-Qadi, Saudi, and Abdul Latif Saleh, 
indicted in the early 2000s for terrorism financing charges, had previously built a mosque 
in Kukës, another city amongst the country’s poorest, located in the northeast of Albania. 
Saleh, a Jordanian who obtained an Albanian passport in the early 1990s is accused of 
leading a terrorist group in Albania, which was funded by the AFH (p. 10). The U.S. 
Department of Treasury alleged his cooperation with Osama bin Laden over this matter. 
As it is reported by the ICG (2001) report, there is also a strong belief that Osama bin 
Laden visited Albania in the period 1992‒1996 (p. 5). The beliefs are not proven 
officially but, despite that, the later arrest of al Qaeda operatives in Albania and the 
presence of NGOs and charities that were globally known as supporters of terrorism and 
Al Qaeda only reinforces those beliefs. The dubious relationship between Albanian 
authorities and Islamic entities present in Albania in the years 1992‒1996 allows the rise 
of suspicions. Saleh the country fled mysteriously following the 9/11 attacks in the 
United States. 
E. THE RELIGIOUS TENSION WITHIN ALBANIA 
The effects of the Islamic “humanitarian operations” at a wider level would be 
seen in the early 2000s when some declarations within the Albanian Muslim Community 
(AMC) came to public attention. These declarations denounced the pressure coming from 
Islamic graduates of foreign Islamic schools, who were trying to replace the old clerics, 
who professed a traditional form of Islam, which has nothing in common with the more 
radical and extremist forms of worship propagandized by these graduates. The mysterious 
killing of a prominent member of the AMC in his office in Tirana in 2003 shocked the 
Albanian public and made the government put more efforts into guaranteeing security for 
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the AMC leaders. The Albanian “Salafists,” despite not being identified formally, had 
also been causing tension among the Bektashi Muslims in Albania. The Bektashi sect is 
based on the Sufi ideology of Islam, and the Albanian Bektashi are well known for their 
liberalism in regard to religious norms. As Vickers reports (2008, p. 8) the Bektashi 
community leaders in Albania have clearly denounced the criticism made toward them by 
Albanian Salafi Muslims and rejected any supposition suggesting their relationship with 
Iranian agencies, other than those promoting the cultural links and socio-cultural 
cooperation. 
Foreign funded groups also tried to get a political representation on two different 
occasions, but both were rejected for incompatibility with the secular nature of the 
Albanian state and irregularities in the documentation (Vickers, 2008, p. 6). 
F. PAST TERRORIST THREATS TO ALBANIA 
All the NGOs mentioned earlier were connected with terrorists that were 
members of different terrorist groups, such as the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIG), the 
Algerian Islamic Armed Group (GIA), Iranian Intelligence cells (DoS, 1996), al Qaeda 
(DoS, 1999), etc. The GIA, a perpetrator of a series of attacks in Western Europe, was 
financed by Al Qaeda for a certain period (Nesser, 2008, p. 224), and its members 
operated mostly in Bosnia, but operatives of the Bosnian cell tried to establish a presence 
also in Albania (DoS, 2001). The most serious threat in matters of Islamic terrorism to 
Albania remains the threat presented by an Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIG) cell, which 
started to operate in the country in 1990 and reached the number of more than a dozen 
operatives in a few years. Their “accommodation” was provided by Islamic NGOs 
present in the country. The EIJ cell in Albania was led initially by Mohammed al-
Zawahiri, the brother of Ayman al-Zawahiri, current leader of Al Qaeda, and at the time 
the leader of EIJ. He was employed as an engineer for IIRO since its establishment in the 
country. Consequently, the cell was headed by El-Sayed Abdel Maqsud and Shawqi 
Salama Mustafa Atiya. Mohammed also worked as an engineer for the Global Relief 
Organization office in Tirana, while Atiya was employed as a teacher in an orphanage 
funded by the RIHS. Most of the 20 reported members of the cell (Higgins & Cooper, 
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2001), were arrested by Albanian authorities and rendered to Egypt by 1999, where they 
were prosecuted during one of the most famous trials of the time there. The trial itself 
was often referred to as the trial of the “returnees from Albania.” The cell was disrupted 
in several consecutive raids on its safe houses in Tirana. Most of the terrorists were 
arrested and secretly rendered to Egypt, while a couple of them were reported to have 
escaped and one killed during the action (DoS, 1998).  
The members of EIJ’s cell in Albania who were handed over to Egypt included: 
Husam Muhammad Khamis Nuwayr, aka Adil Anwar, Ahmad ‘Abd-al-Fattah Sayyid, 
Hasan Salih Mahmud, Shawqi Salama Mustafa Atiya, Ahmad Ibrahim al-Sayyid al-
Naggar, aka Mohamed Ragab Foudah, Muhammad Hassan Tita, Ahmad Isma’il Uthman, 
Ahmed Refa’i Taha, Mohammad Zeki Mahjoub, Yassir al-Sirri, Magdi Ibrahim al-Sayyid 
al-Naggar, Abdel-Akher Hammad, El-Sayed Abdel-Maqsud, Muhammad al-Islambouli, 
Khalid Abdullah, Mohammed Atef, Ahmed Osman Saleh, and Isam Muhammad Khalil, 
aka Ahmad Bakr. They were all responsible for terrorist attacks in Egypt and active 
plotters for further attacks. Another member of the cell was Essam Abdel-Tawwab, who 
had previously left Albania but was soon arrested in Sofia, Bulgaria. Returning to our 
NGOs employees, these individuals were employed at large, mainly by four charities in 
Albania: the AHF, the GIRF, the BIF, and the RIHS. They also specialized in different 
tasks. Atiya specialized in forging official documentation, especially passports and 
identity cards, while al-Naggar was the group’s propagandist. Hammad was a cleric and 
supposed to be also a propagandist of the Salafi Islam amongst Albanians within his 
reach during the time he stayed in Albania. Ahmed Taha was also a former emir of 
Gama’a al-Islamiyya, before it shrank into the EIJ. The employment of these individuals 
in Islamic charities was organized initially by Mohammed al-Zawahiri, who also charged 
Tita with collecting part of the salaries of the EIJ members in order to create a “special” 
fund. Tita later would organize the coming of both Atiya and Saleh in Albania.  
For a long time there was a little known about their activities in Albania. Also, 
there is still no publicly disclosed information about the role of the donors for the Islamic 
charities on the employment of the EIJ members in Albania. A general explanation of this 
organized inward flow of jihadis in Albania recalls the opportunities presented by 
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Albania, as a potential safe haven for the wanted members of the EIJ, but also as a 
remedy for the lack funds of the organization. Higgins and Cooper (2001) on this 
perspective recall a meeting in the early 1990s of Ayman al-Zawahiri with another 
prominent member of the jihadi movement in Sana, Yemen, where he mentioned the 
severe lack of funds for the organization. From this perspective the open positions of the 
Islamic charities in Albania might have provided the necessary funds for the EIJ 
members. The later merging of the EIJ with bin Laden’s Al Qaeda remains consistent 
with this explanation. The “merge” was well accepted also by the cell in Albania, as its 
announcement came by phone to the cell members, which were monitored by the 
Albanian intelligence service.  
Higgins and Cooper (2001) described the group as a “sleeper” cell, but after the 
publication of further facts linked to the EIJ cell, it came up that the group was plotting 
an attack against the U.S. Embassy in Tirana. The 1999 closure of the American Embassy 
in Tirana and the evacuation of its personnel was due to the risks associated with other 
EIJ members who escaped or circumvented the 1998 counterterrorist operations (Binaj, 
2004, p. 66). Those operations were not conducted without operational and political 
pressure. The EIJ, led by Ayman Al-Zawahiri, launched several public threats against 
Albanian authorities after the extradition of the cell members to Egyptian authorities.  
G. THE COUNTERTERRORISM ACTIONS OF THE ALBANIAN 
SECURITY FORCES AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS 
The operation in the summer of 1998, which rounded up the EIJ members in 
Albania, had a pre-emptive nature, given the destabilization of Albania in the previous 
year, the spread of weapons amongst the population, and also because of the emerging 
conflict on the northeastern border in Kosovo. The arrests were conducted secretly and 
their extradition to Egypt was made possible by U.S. aircraft. The cooperation between 
Albanian and U.S. intelligence agencies has always been excellent, often going beyond 
the limits recognized by the Albanian law in regard to imprisonment or detainee rights 
(OSJI, 2013). 
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Despite of the lack of security and stability, due to previous internal disorders and 
the emergence of the Kosovo crisis in early 1999, Albanian authorities kept on pursuing 
suspected individuals engaged in terrorism. In late 1999 three foreigners, two Syrians and 
an Iraqi, had been arrested for suspected terrorist activities and later convicted on 
falsification charges. They were all expelled in June of the same year, after serving their 
short prison sentence. In October 1999, two individuals suspected of engaging in 
terrorism and having ties to Osama bin Laden were expelled from Albania by the 
authorities (DoS, 1999). The two were in Albania as missionaries of an Islamic 
humanitarian NGO dealing with refugee assistance. The names of the NGOs were not 
disclosed in public. 
The counterterrorist operations of the late 1990s in Albania sought to annihilate 
the groups and individuals linked to terrorism that were operating the country, but less 
was done to counter their financial sources. Despite the clarity of the connection between 
Islamic foreign-funded charities, radical Islam spread among Albanians and the foreign 
terrorists connected with them. Beyond these initial efforts the jihadi “enterprise” was not 
annihilated in Albania.  
The government’s action toward the Islamic NGOs was affected mainly by two 
factors. The first is connected to their wide engagement in humanitarian activities and 
their religious symbolism. The difficulty of shutting down these organizations “does not 
only affect the lives of people immediately connected with the humanitarian role of the 
charities but also affects the state’s image in matters of religion” (Lewitt & Jacobsen, 
2007, p. 37). Albania had to face another difficulty on this issue, related to its 
international relations with the countries from where the money was coming. The 
Albanian government has profited itself from sigifnicant amounts of money from Islamic 
countries, which often finance costly infrastructural projects. Williams (2007) recognizes 
two main reasons in the difficulty of pursuing charities connected with terrorism: a 
general reticence on going after whoever sits behind the charities, and the flexibility of 
the charities to change their names and status making it difficult for state authorities to 
pursue them fast enough (pp. 76–77). 
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The assumptions are both right. With regard to the NGOs’ flexibility to change 
their data or denomination, in Albania, this was verified with the AFH, which changed its 
denomination and status several times, until the authorities shut it down while it was 
known as “Jeta” (life, in Albanian).  
The second factor that limited the Albanian counterterrorist response was due to 
the lack of proper organization and knowledge for conducting a large-scale 
counterterrorist finance operation. The counterterrorist finance operation in Albania 
started after the attacks of 9/11, but faced several difficulties. As reported by the U. S. 
Department of State (DoS) (2006) on the Albanian counterterrorist financing operations: 
We note that the effectiveness of the government’s counterterrorist 
financing efforts was hampered by inadequate financial resources, poor 
communications, a lack of data processing infrastructure, and the lack of 
experienced personnel due to frequent turnover. 
Furthermore, the DoS (2007) determined that “the effectiveness of the 
government’s counterterrorist financing effort was undermined by a lack of data-
processing infrastructure and an inadequate capability to track and manage cases 
properly.” 
The DoS observations were made on the counterterrorist financing operations of 
the Albanian authorities from 2001 through 2005, when most of the Islamic NGOs were 
shut down, their accounts were frozen, and their foreign officials were deported to their 
countries of origin. The operations also included the freezing of private businesses owned 
by Arab businessmen, such as the Caravan Company of al-Qadi. In total, the assets that 
were frozen after those operations amounted to $20 million (Kullolli, 2009, 47). In 2002 
the country adopted a national counterterrorist plan, (Woehrel, 2005, p.6), and by 2004 
signed all the 12 counterterrorist agreements at UN level, while improving national law in 
matters of terrorist funding and money laundering. Other counterterrorist finance 
operations included the running a nationwide check of means of stay of foreign nationals 
residing in the country, focusing especially on the documentation of foreigners coming 
from Arabic countries (ICG, 2001, p. 4). The law enforcement operation included also 
the identification and verification of staffs of several Islamic non-governmental 
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organizations, such as the Red Crescent, the Coordination Council of Islamic 
Associations, the Islamic World Committee and the Koran Foundation, besides the 
shutting down of the AHF, TWRA, BIF, and others. Further steps were taken in the 
private financial sector, by checking the financial transactions of Islamic financial 
institutions operating in the country, such as the Arab-Albanian Islamic Bank and the 
Malaysian Inter-commercial Bank and by checking other private financial institutions 
databases for suspicious transnational financial activities originating from Islamic 
countries. A few foreign employees of the Arab-Albanian Islamic Bank were arrested and 
deported to their home countries.  
Moreover, especially after 9/11, many Islamic NGOs operating in Albania had 
vanished as their objectives were not met or their funds dried out, when Saudi Arabia and 
other Gulf states cracked down on individuals and organizations related with terrorism 
that had been funding those NGOs (Woehrel, 2005, p. 1). An example may be the 
Jeddah-based International Islamic Relief Organization (aka IGASA) or the Al-Qadi’s Al 
Muwafaq Foundation. 
H. JIHADI LEFTOVERS AND POTENTIAL THREATS 
Considering the events related to Islamic NGOs connected with terrorists in 
Albania as a particular “cycle of life” of the jihadi enterprise in a Balkan country, we find 
that this model applies similarly in all the Balkan countries, only through a different 
timeline. Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Macedonia, were flooded by Islamic NGOs in the 
early 1990s, while Kosovo experienced the same as soon as the war ended in 1999. The 
Saudi Joint Relief Committee for Kosovo (SJRCK), a Saudi foundation, appeared in 
Kosovo in late 1999 and in the first two months alone initiated financing for nearly 400 
of Islamist freelancers to propagate the “Saudi-way” of practicing Islam. It also attempted 
to “reconstruct” a mosque, when stopped by locals, who noticed the will of its contracted 
engineers in destroying ancient grave markers in the mosque’s yard. Several other 
Islamic NGOs flooded the country in the years following the end of war. The financial 
inflow toward Kosovo from these organizations amounted to millions of dollars (U.S.) a 
year (ICG, 2001a, p. 6). Through their funding they sought to radicalize the population 
 56 
and convert it to the Wahhabi and Salafi sects of Islam, which is totally different from a 
long secular tradition, and a very liberal form of Islam practiced by Albanians in Kosovo, 
and that is why the foreign efforts have not succeeded (DoS, 2004). The Saudi Joint 
Relief Committee for Kosovo has been the biggest disburser of funds for the 
reconstruction of new mosques in an Arabic-style, rather than in a traditional Turkish-
Albanian architecture, providing scholarships and financing reclusive organizations (IGC, 
2001, p. 20).  
In 2001 the number of Islamic NGOs and charities in Kosovo was up to 30. An 
inflow of funds seeking to change the way Muslims practice Islam in the Balkans has 
been reported also from Macedonia and Montenegro, but to a lesser extent than that of 
Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo. During the Kosovo war there was also an attempt made by 
Wahhabi mujahedeen, coming from the Bosnian war, to join the Kosovo conflict but they 
were refused immediately by Kosovo-Albanian leaders (Lederer, 2001, p. 5). Instead, 
given the circumstances they found several safe places in Kosovo and in Southern Serbia, 
which is inhabited by Muslim communities. Their presence and their organizations are 
not supported by any of the governments, but they quite often receive funds by Saudi 
funded NGOs operating in the countries (Vickers, 2008, p. 8). 
In all Balkan countries the Islamic NGOs have exploited the social and economic 
situation of the countries to conduct their activities, often including the employment of 
foreign persons, and offering financial benefits to locals in exchange for promoting Salafi 
and Wahhabi Islam (Lederer, 2001, p. 16). 
Despite their spread in the 1990s, following the 9/11 attacks the number of those 
organizations decreased immediately, especially after the closure of the most notorious of 
them after being accused of links with terrorist organizations. The stance of Arab 
countries was also important, since the funds that were being widely misused were 
derived from them. The Al Haramain office in Bosnia was designated in 2001 as a 
financer of terrorism and linked to bin Laden activities, not only by the U.S. authorities 
but also by Saudi Arabia. That made investigations easier and further funds or assets 
could be frozen in the Balkans (DoS, 2005). The Muwafaq Foundation, or Blessed Relief, 
founded by Yasin al-Qadi, an Osama bin Laden associate was also indicted on terrorism 
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charges. Al-Qadi was present in Albania not only with his charity but also as a 
businessman, with his several companies in the business of construction and transport 
(Comras, 2007, pp. 119–122). By 2004, all Balkan countries had adopted the UN 
regulations on counterterrorism and implemented several regulations in matters of 
financial control over suspicious funds and counterterrorist finance (Woehrel, 2005, p. 8). 
Returning to the Albanian case, the successes of the physical crackdown on the 
EIJ cell, and of other individuals connected with terrorism activities in the pre-9/11 
period, and the collective and simultaneous closure of Islamic NGOs and charities in the 
years 2001‒2005, reduced the threat of terrorism in Albania only partially. The terrorism 
threat is a challenging issue given the inheritance of the decade-long jihadist engagement 
in the country. The risks presented are associated with the radicalization of the youth by 
mosques and community centers in which is professed a radical form of Islam often 
conflicting with the human rights and civil liberties laws of the country, but also by the 
appearance of jihadi-motivated websites and forums on the Internet. The mosques and 
centers are easily identified, since they are not operating under the authority of the AMC. 
Vickers reports that in 2008 there were 450–500 mosques operating outside the authority 
of the AMC, since they were built and being run by foreign funded organizations. Also, 
the number of students having studied in foreign Islamic countries, with very different 
religious traditions from Albania, has risen to 1500 (2008, p. 10). The challenge is to 
prevent radicalization and possible terrorist recruitment. Another risk is represented by 
the Albanian individuals who were associated and cooperated with the Islamic NGOs that 
were shut down. They were carefully selected by the foreign directors as being the most 
loyal to them, but none was indicted along with their foreign collaborators (Vickers, 
2008, p. 10). The community of supporters of those NGOs may represent additional 
opportunities for leverage for future jihadi enterprises. The case of Artan Kristo, aka 
Mohamed Abdullahi, a former employee of AFH, who was indicted in 2009 for calling 
for jihad in Albanian Web forums, provides a good example of the radicalization of these 
individuals.  
Another issue that should be considered is the general financial security 
environment in Albania, as well as in the wider region, which is still considered as a 
 58 
financial haven for organized crime and governed by the most corrupt governments. In 
the case of Albania, Gjoni (2006) reports that the “Albanian organized crime groups have 
managed to infiltrate the government, assumed governmental functions, and neutralized 
law enforcement (p. 71). Albania is ranked as the country with the highest level 
corruption in the region (TI, 2013). Despite the elimination of the threat posed by well-
organized terrorist groups that operated in the country in the 1990s, the actual 
counterterrorism efforts should be focused on the prevention of terrorist financing and 
radicalization, which may enable occasional targeting of Albanian objectives. Nesser 
(2008) provides a chronology of jihadism in Europe and identifies three different roles of 
Europe in relation to jihad. He maintains (p. 925) that from 1994 to 1996 Europe 
functioned as an arena for local jihad, from 1998 to 2004 as an arena for global jihad, and 
finally, from 2003 to 2004 and following, as a target for global jihad.  
Strengthening the rule of law and exercising major control on foreign-funded 
NGOs is fundamental in preventing radicalization of terrorist recruitment. As stated in an 
ICG report on the Balkans (2001): 
It appears that only Bosnia has significant numbers of potential Islamist 
extremists. Elsewhere the potential for Islamist-inspired violence seems 
slight, and to hinge on the weakness of institutions rather than ideological 
sympathies with the enemies of the West. (p. i) 
A subsequent ICG report (2005) appraises the counterterrorism effort of the 
Balkan countries, but it mentions the need for special emphasis on the democratic 
performances of these countries and a substantial improvement of the state of law, in 
order to counter effectively terrorist efforts. 
I. CONCLUSIONS: CHALLENGES FOR THE PRESENT AND FUTURE 
The 1998 counterterrorist operation, which disrupted a “sleeper cell” of the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad in Tirana, targeted foreign individuals hiding in Albania and 
operating disguised as charity workers. As Higgins and Cooper (2001) report, Mohamed 
Zawahri, brother of the al Qaeda’s chief Ayman al Zawahri, was responsible since the 
early 1992 for organizing the incoming and housing foreign jihadis as charity workers of 
the Islamic Relief Organization. The IIRO was not the only NGO serving as a 
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communion place for the Egyptian Jihad members. Al Haramein was also eager to offer 
jobs to recommended foreigners. The initial strategy adopted by the Albanian 
government, supported also by the U.S. government, was to exploit these networks and 
obtain as much information as possible on them. This strategy changed as soon as the 
Egyptian Islamic Jihad merged with bin Laden’s al Qaeda, and subsequently tried to 
attack the local U.S. embassy (Clarke, 2004), but also in light of the deterioration of the 
internal political and security situation in Albania. The then-newly-formed al Qaeda cell 
was disrupted without having a chance to engage in violent actions, and its leaders were 
deported to Egypt and elsewhere. The operation also drew attention to al Qaeda’s 
leadership, which released a public condemnation note along with the promise to 
retaliate. The later counterterrorist finance measures, starting from 2001 and ending in 
2005, cut the funds and shut down NGOs and charities affiliated with terrorist 
organizations.  
Since 2005 there have been no major counterterrorist operations in Albania 
known to the public, but the terrorist threat is present due to a number of factors. First, 
the community of Albanian nationals which developed relationships with foreign jihadis 
in the past is quite numerous, and several exponents of them have since been indicted on 
terrorism charges. Artan Kristo, the online jihadi activist, previously employed by the 
AHF is an example. Second, a radical form of Islam is still being professed in Albania by 
foreign-educated Islamic preachers in mosques outside the national religious institution’s 
influence. While these preachers tend to carefully disguise their radical points of view, an 
avid propaganda campaign is being conducted on the Internet. The aforementioned 
preachers tend to openly criticize the liberal form of Islam practiced in Albania (and 
Kosovo, Macedonia, and elsewhere), while often engaging in radical discourse, which 
challenges common narratives about the state laicism, security concerns, and 
international relations involving Albania and other countries, especially Kosovo and 
Macedonia. The immediate goal of this activity is to radicalize Albanians, while in some 
cases it has been a precursor to criminal and terrorist activities conducted or planned by 
militants of the radical and jihadi-inspired form of Islam promoted openly on the Internet, 
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and semi-covertly in the physical world. (See Gilaj (2012), Express (2012), Indeks 
Online (2013)). 
Third, the jihadi propaganda developed through the preaching in selected 
religious institutions and the widespread Internet-based propaganda has managed to 
convert many Albanian Muslims to a more radical Islam. This can be verified first by 
noticing the quantity and quality of jihadi information operations in Albanian, and 
second, by noticing real life examples of Albanians embracing the jihadi narrative and 
acting accordingly. The examples of the Albanian victims killed in the Syrian conflict, 
where they are reported to have joined the Al-Nusra Front, a terrorist organization 
affiliated with al Qaeda, and the reports of tens of others who have joined the ranks of 
that organization make the case for concern (Biçaku, 2013; Al-Arnaout, 2013; Ninkovic, 
2013). 
The challenges presented by the terrorist threat to Albanians should be managed 
by obtaining accurate intelligence on the factors that drive Albanian nationals into the 
jihad. While traditional intelligence gathering methods are fundamental, the analyzing of 
the jihadi narratives and information operations on the Internet are equally important.  
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V. ANALYSIS OF JIHADI INFORMATION OPERATIONS IN 
THE ALBANIAN LANGUAGE ON  
SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES 
A. PREVIOUS RESEARCH  
There have been several attempts to study jihadist Internet strategies and 
operations, and there is a lot of research going on for providing security agencies with 
technical products that make data from social networking sites easier to analyze. Given 
the difficulty of extracting representative samples or analyzing the whole Web in order to 
analyze the effectiveness of jihadist propaganda, most of the studies conducted have a 
descriptive profile rather than an analytical one. This is due to the difficulties of 
gathering, analyzing, and interpreting raw data collected from the Internet in general, and 
social networking sites in particular. The anonymity provided by the Internet and the 
impossibility of verifying the trustworthiness of the information spread through Internet 
applications contribute to uncertainties of interpretation of the analysis conducted using 
that data. The same characteristics also define the efforts to analyze the jihadi presence 
on the Web. Bunt (2003) underlines the difficulties in determining location and timing of 
the upload of online information by users and the global dimension of propagation of 
information, and introduces the term e-jihad for describing the jihadist Web-based 
information flow (pp. 25–28). Despite these difficulties there are some attempts that offer 
logical explanations supported by limited data sets. 
Janbeck and Prado (2012) conducted research between 2009 and 2010 in an 
attempt to analyze the discursive strategies and representations of virtual communities of 
a few dozen terrorist-related websites. They agreed with the general assertion that the 
Internet is used by terrorists to disseminate propaganda, organize the membership, 
communicate information, fundraise, and recruit new members (p. 23) and provide 
documented argumentation of that. Despite the limited number of websites they analyzed, 
they noted that none of these websites offered interactive content, such as chat rooms, 
forums, etc. They explained this lack of service as a cautious choice by terrorists, in order 
to maintain a tight control of the discourse over the Web. Nonetheless, the websites were 
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interconnected with other websites with similar contentWebs (p. 24). The research 
conducted by them is a model that offers insights within a restricted area. Although they 
analyzed only websites, and not any other Internet sources or platforms, their format may 
also be used for analyzing social networking site profiles or pages. 
Another way of conducting social networking analysis is proposed by Weisburd 
(2012), who proposes an “artisanal approach” model. His artisanal approach consists of 
an individual approach to track and analyze the imprint of suspected terrorists in social 
networking sites, without any specific agenda, just a willingness to follow any traces of 
suspected profiles. However, he limits the effectiveness of this approach solely to 
individuals who may alert investigators by explicitly showing online the extremist side of 
their identity, or by being members of dark networks on the Web.  
Gerger and Strathearn (2013) approach the challenge by setting up a scoring 
system in order to find out which social media accounts (they focus mainly on Twitter) 
within a specific extremist circle are most influential and most prone to influence and call 
the tendency to exposure (i.e., how many tweets) (p. 3). They identify as influence the 
tendency of a user to inspire a measurable reaction from other users, such as replies, re-
tweets, etc. (p. 4). As defined by them, a cumulative measure, which is the interactivity, 
is obtained from the sum of influence and exposure scores. After analyzing a number of 
social media accounts belonging to nationalist Internet users, they find that only 1% of 
the accounts tend to be influential, that influence and exposure are highly correlated, and 
that users scoring high in terms of interactivity are highly engaged ideologically. 
Conway and McInerney (2008) have conducted similar research on YouTube and 
gathered data found on jihadi channels, which they analyzed through descriptive statistics 
and basic social networking analyses techniques. In their study the authors focus more on 
providing evidence of the jihadis’ interaction with the public and among themselves 
rather than researching influence factors. Also Bermingham (et al., n.d.) apply social 
network analysis to explore the potential for online radicalization in jihadi channels on 
YouTube, but they also apply sentiment analysis for the purpose.  
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Zelin and Fellow (2013) also mention the paucity of research conducted for 
understanding how the jihadi activists propagate their messages on the Web. They 
identify a decline in the use of forums as a primary channel of public communication by 
jihadis and an increasing use of social networking sites. They recognize that social 
networking sites present more complexities than traditional forums, in which jihadis have 
largely been focused earlier, and they also focus on using descriptive statistics in 
gathering intelligence for analyzing the jihadi performance on the Web. 
Wathen and Burkell (2002) contribute indirectly to the effort by providing a 
theoretical model that deals with explaining how credibility is established during the 
interaction of users and the information found on line. Although the research approaches 
the problem from the user’s perspective it is also relevant to determine the potential of 
the uploaded content. Figure 1, which is taken from the authors study, explains in detail 
how cognitive processes are developed by the users in order to trust the information 
found on the website. The authors maintain that the assessment of credibility of Internet 
information is iterative and it develops through three stages (p. 142).  
 
Figure 1.  Model of how users judge the credibility of online information  
(from Wathen and Burkell, 2002, p. 141). 
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In the first stage the user evaluates the surface characteristics of the site. Here the 
appearance, the interface design, the download speed, and interactivity offered by the site 
are key factors on which the visitor develops his first impression. The authors maintain 
that this step is a pass/fail one; practically speaking, if the visitor does not like what he 
sees first, he is going to leave the website. In the second stage the visitor analyzes the 
credibility of the message, evaluating the content, the source and its credentials, the 
accuracy, currency, and relevancy of the information found, and he will also evaluate the 
pertinenance of the information found. During this stage the visitor “skims” the 
information, decides if it is generally important for his purposes and accurate enough, and 
then proceeds to the next step. If the website does not pass the second stage, the visitor 
most likely would leave it. In the case the visitor is interested, he will proceed to the third 
and last step. Here the visitor is more focused and pays a lot more attention to the 
information provided by the website. At this stage, completeness and details become 
powerful factors.  
Besides individual approaches in analyzing jihadi uses of social networking sites 
there are also more organized platforms in place that serve as databases of jihadi content 
collected from social networking sites. The Dark Web Forum Portal (Chen, et al., n.d.) is 
an example of this kind of effort. 
Even so, to date there is no commonly accepted and substantial methodology or 
analytical approach to determine why some jihadist information operations are successful 
and others are not. A reason for that might be the continuously evolving nature of the 
Internet, and especially the difficulty of researcher to follow-up its evolution and adopt 
the analytical methodologies in order to exploit opportunities offered by the social 
networking sites, which have become the melting pot of every single type of use 
previously distributed meticulously in separate applications of the Internet.  
Everton (2012) recognizes the growing importance of social media and the 
potential for a proper study of them (p. 70) while assessing that the techniques of 
collecting and processing data obtained from them are in their infancy (p. 71). In fact, the 
tools available for the study of social networking sites consist of computer programs able 
to track, collect, and process the data gathered through social networking sites or through 
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the Web. These programs enable researchers or investigators to find and structure data, 
but do not provide further qualitative analysis, which is left to the human analyst. The 
data-structuring and the resulting analysis itself are also dependent on human 
assumptions, which are often based on factors deriving from incomplete research on the 
jihadis’ use of the Internet al.so, another risk of automatic collection and data-structuring 
programs may be leaving behind important information. Despite that, raw data needs 
explanation and proper coding. Following the collection and structuring of data, the 
biggest problem for the human operator is to give them the meaning that they have in the 
real world. The same problems are also faced for conducting a thorough analysis of jihadi 
information operations on social networking sites. 
Since the current evolution of technology does not allow any exhaustive 
automated research and analysis of all the jihadi content present in social networking 
sites, alternate ways of dealing with the problem are needed. A way around conducting 
research and obtaining accurate analysis on those kinds of uses of the Internet might be 
the identification of important factors and characteristics, which may help researchers and 
analysts to identify smaller and qualitative sets of data, eliminate redundancies, and 
obtain better intelligence. The methodology, which is elaborated on in this chapter, seeks 
to identify those factors and characteristics, and at the same time, sets an example on how 
to approach the challenge of analyzing jihadi information strategies.  
B. ELEMENTS OF SUCCESS IN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF 
PROMINENT JIHADIS ON THE USE OF THE INTERNET  
The approach for analyzing potential success or failure of jihadi information 
operations on social networking sites should take into account two major influential 
factors: first, the recommendations made by prominent jihadi ideologues over the public 
image of the jihad, and second, the exploitation of the social networking site capabilities 
by jihadis. The jihadi ideologues’ viewpoints on information management, although of a 
rhetorical nature most of the time, especially when related to the traditional and high-
level leadership, can be framed in order to be operationalized for further analysis. Along 
with the interpretation of the jihadi leadership recommendations from an operational 
perspective, it is worthy to mention that ideological divisions over the issue of the 
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organization (centralized vs. decentralized) for the jihad do not influence ideological 
perspectives on the management of the information or mediatic jihad. Recommendations 
of this nature have to be accepted and expected to be complementary to each other, 
independently from the source.  
Regarding the previous research and analysis of the scriptures and public 
messages of prominent jihadi ideologues, we have found the following elements within 
their recommendations that apply for the conduct of a successful jihadi information 
operation:  
• The element of quantity and outreach – This twofold element can be 
noticed in the recommendations of every prominent jihadi ideologue. 
Framed for the purpose of the analysis of jihadi information operations on 
social networking sites, this element presupposes that jihadi activists 
should fill the Internet with jihadi material, in as many outlets as possible 
in order to reach an optimal audience.  
• The element of networking – Prominent jihadis recommend that the spread 
of the call to jihad is a common effort. On this matter al-Suri and al-Salim 
are the most prolific and offer detailed recommendations. Framed for the 
purpose of this study, this element assumes that in order to achieve 
success jihadis should actively participate in the common effort to spread 
jihadi content over the Internet, provide feedback, expand, and share the 
materials through different outlets.  
• The element of specific tailoring ‒ Prominent jihadis recommend that for a 
successful jihadism on the Web the communications should be tailored to 
their specific audience. This element presupposes that jihadi information 
operations shall tend toward matching narratives, using local languages 
and symbolism.  
• The element of audiovisual exploitation of the media – Prominent jihadis 
recognize the power of properly arranged messages. This element 
presupposes that higher audiovisual editing standards and originality 
provide higher chances of success. 
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These elements, in this form, may provide to researchers and analysts a theoretical 
explanation of the factors for potential success of jihadi information operations, but in 
order to be used for analytical purposes they need to be operationalized. The 
operationalization of these elements is done through a process that takes into account the 
current developments and opportunities offered by the Internet, and in our case, the social 
networking sites. Generally speaking, social networking sites provide users with publicly 
available data on the performance of other users’ postings, or other users’ activity on the 
site. The user may as well choose to remain anonymous or restrict the release of his data 
to third parties, but for our purposes that is a nonsense situation, since our object of study 
is focused on extroversive uses of social networking sites. In Table 2 we provide the data 
which are easily obtained by visiting two major social networking sites,7 YouTube and 
Facebook, and which may help to measure the elements of performance of jihadi 
information operations: 
  
7 The same type of data can also be obtained on a case-by-case basis from other traditional websites, 
Web logs, or not previously mentioned social networking sites.  
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- #Subscriptions driven by post; 
- #Shares; 
- Time watched; 
- #Comments; 
- #Videos posted by user; 





Networking - Usernames of other users that 
have interacted/responded to 
postings of the original user; 
- Web links (or hyperlinks) to 
other websites, social 
networking sites user profiles; 
- Names of 
organization/group/individual 
mentioned in the postings; 
- Usernames of other users that 
have interacted/responder to 
postings of the original user; 
- Web links to other websites, 
social networking sites user 
profiles; 
- Names of 
organization/group/individual 
mentioned in the postings; 
Specific tailoring - Language used (or dialects); 
- Date of posting (to match with 
important local events); 
- Topic; 
- Name of user; 
- Location of user; 
- Other data (Description 
section); 
- Language used (or dialects) 
- Date of posting (to match with 
important local events); 
- Topic; 
- Name of user; 
- Location of user; 
- Other data (About section); 
Audiovisual 
exploitation 
- Quality of editing; 
- Audiovisual quality; 
- Branding; 
- Length of video; 
- Quality of editing; 
- Audiovisual quality; 
- Branding; 
Table 2.   Measurement data of jihadi recommended elements for success of jihadi 
information operations. 
  
8 The sign “#” stands for “number of.” 
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The measurement data reported in Table 2 can be collected mostly as they are 
shown on the Web spaces of social networking sites.9 Some of the measurements may 
have to be coded by the researcher, such as the “Quality of editing” and the “Audiovisual 
quality.” The “quality of editing” may be coded by assignment of points. An example 
might be: 4 points for material showing messages released by members (conational, in-
group) of the target audience; 3 points for material that is edited by including a voiceover 
in the language of the target audience; 2 points for material that is edited by including 
subtitles in the language of the target audience; 1 point  for material in a foreign 
language, without translations or special editing to make it more comprehensible to the 
target audience. The “audiovisual quality” may be coded through a simple scale, such as: 
3 points for high quality material; 2 points for average quality material; 1 point for poor 
quality material.  
The collection of measurement data of the elements recommended from 
prominent jihadis for the success of the jihadi information operations may provide 
detailed information for each jihadi information operation on social networking site, but 
to identify factors of success or failure needs further processing. At this point the 
identification of these factors may be done through building a dataset with data from 
jihadi information operations and mining through the data. The data obtained on the 
quantity and outreach element is of fundamental value. It is important not only because it 
is quantified numerically, but also because the bigger the audience, the greater the 
chances of success of jihadi information operations on social networking sites. Yet, in 
itself the measure does not provide any qualitative analysis. By comparing the measures 
of the quantity and outreach elements with the measures of other elements through the 
use of different methods of analysis, it is possible to obtain qualitative insights on the 
overall performance of each jihadi information operations compared to others. By this 
approach it is possible to observe trends and patterns of performance based on the two  
 
 
9 Of course other data may be obtained through social networking sites, simply by visiting the Web 
spaces of interest, but I report here the data which is easier to identify, obtain, code and process for further 
analysis. 
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major influential factors mentioned earlier: the suggestions of prominent jihadi leaders 
and a realistic quantitative dataset extracted from the social networking sites, where 
common jihadis and their sympathizers conduct their part in the jihad.  
C. BUILDING AND ANALYZING THE DATASET 
Beside the theoretical and textual-historical approach in identifying factors of 
success or failure in the conduction of jihadi information operations on the Internet, to 
obtain better results in the study, we build a dataset, which help to test empirically 
determined factors quantitatively and qualitatively. The building of a dataset for this 
purpose faces a few challenges, which are described briefly in the following subsection..  
1. Where To Start? 
First and foremost, it must be determined from which social networking site data 
from jihadi-inspired content on social networking sites will be obtained. We chose 
YouTube, the first major user-generated content website, but also one of the most visited 
social networking sites. YouTube is widely used by jihadists or their sympathizers to 
spread audiovisual content serving the purposes of the jihad. Kohlmann (2011) recalls the 
potential of YouTube as a radicalization tool in the hands of the terrorists. Weimann 
(2011) also refers to YouTube as the first choice of jihadis to communicate with the 
public, while he considers some messages from prominent jihadis that discourage their 
sympathizers from using Facebook, another major social networking site, since it is 
considered a dangerous and potentially corrupt platform. 
YouTube is also the third most-visited website in Albania, following Facebook 
and Google (Alexa, 2013). The first in the ranking of most-visited websites by Albanians 
is Facebook, which is also a social networking site, but we chose YouTube because of its 
presence in the market earlier, higher perceived anonymity of operation, and because it is 
a preferred platform for jihadists to conduct their information operations.  
In addition, we chose Albania, because it is better suited to the purposes of our 
research. Use of the Internet in Albania is above the world average, and almost equivalent 
to average usage in the European region. Albania’s history and challenges in matters of 
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terrorism and radicalization are better described in Chapter II, and in line with the 
concepts introduced in Chapter III, Albania, from a technical perspective, may be 
described as a country where the Internet penetration levels are satisfactory, and the IC 
community has a potential for developing intelligence gathering methodologies and 
countering strategies against the uses of the Internet for jihadism purposes.  
2. Local Language-Driven Research 
Gunaratna (2002) in analyzing al Qaeda as an international organization maintains 
that although it is an internationally operating entity, its affiliates tend to operate locally 
and recruit from “among their own nationalities, families and friends” (p.129). This is 
quite logical. Such is also our intent to start by focusing on jihadi information operations 
in the Albanian language. The Albanian language is a unique language that is spoken by 
the Albanian population in Albania, Kosovo, FYROM, and Montenegro, and by Albanian 
populations living in other countries. No other nation in the world speaks Albanian 
naturally. For the purposes of this research, by looking for jihadi information operations 
in Albanian, a researcher automatically identifies the target audience. By researching and 
identifying jihadi information operations in the same language the researcher also obtains 
a highly representative sample within the global “population” of jihadi information 
operations. Sageman (2004) affirms that the language serves as a useful limiting factor 
(p. 162) in building a consistent sample of jihadist propaganda. In addition a language-
driven research makes the research easier and more consistent.   
The research can be started by using keywords in the pre-established language 
matching with the object of research. We use only one keyword: jihad, which in Albanian 
is written “xhihad” and spelled the same as in English. Actually other than the little 
change in the written word, it makes a substantial change when researching into the site’s 
search engine. For other languages it may be different. A way around that may be to 
research through other combinations of words recalling some jihadi activity, or 
individuals, events, places, etc. We stick to the “xhihad” search results (see Figure 2). 
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The search engine identifies 461010 results. The result represents the number of times the 
word is found throughout the YouTube database, not the quantity of videos addressing 
the subject. The word jihad may be found within the video’s titles, within the “about” 
section of each video, within the “comments” section, and may even be a username as 
well. The number of videos that are of interest for the research purpose is much smaller. 
At the end of the research, only 84 videos would fulfill the requirements to be processed 
for data collection. 
 
Figure 2.  A screenshot of the search results by using the keyword “xhihad” (Alb.)  
in YouTube. 
Of course these videos show up first, if the researcher applies the “relevancy” 
filter, set up by YouTube. The relevancy filter makes possible the appearance first of 
videos containing the word jihad in their titles, usernames, and then the videos in which 
the word jihad is found more times within the video’s Web space (“about” and 
“comments” section). The research is exhausted within the evaluation (subject-driven 
research) of the first 200 videos appearing first after the query, but immediate results can 
be noticed as soon as the word jihad does not appear any more in the titles. Of course, 
there might be other videos treating the same subject, which are left out of the research, 
10 Last check conducted on November 22, 2013. Retrieved from: 
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=xhihad&sm=12 
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but that does not make for an issue of concern. The goal here is to attract and influence as 
many users as possible. These users need to be “pulled first” into the video space, and to 
do so, the use of keywords within the title of the video is the most logical choice. In terms 
of Wathen and Burkell’s study (2002) it also provides a better “surface credibility.” In 
some cases users might have decided to unsubscribe from appearing on public searches, 
but this also is excluded from the interest of the research, since the research is focused on 
what is public and meant to be so.  
3. A Subject Driven Research 
The keyword search exploits the automated services provided by social 
networking sites, but it also generates problems, especially in regard to the subject and 
the meaningfulness of the found object compared to the purpose of the study. The word 
jihad has an ambiguous meaning. Generally, it does not have the meaning which is 
promoted by al Qaeda and affiliated organizations. Due to this ambiguity the original 
search might not be as accurate as needed for the purposes of the analysis. At this point it 
is necessary to determine which videos deserve to be identified as jihadi information 
operations, rather than simple YouTube videos.  
According to Hoffman (in Weimann, 2006) al Qaeda’s jihadi propaganda “has 
three basic themes: the West is implacably hostile to Islam; the only way to address the 
West is in the language of violence; and jihad is the only way for true believers” (p. 44). 
This explanation is quite clear, but these elements do not have to concur altogether to 
characterize a communication as prevenient from an al Qaeda sympathizer. Since the 
crackdown on al Qaeda in Afghanistan, many jihadi organizations have franchised al 
Qaeda’s cause and methodology, and they shape their messages according to proper 
needs, often framed carefully in a way to be more compelling to the public. A jihadi-
inspired communication (information operation) may contain concurrently facts, jihadi 
rhetoric, religious rhetoric, religious verses, and other parts that may not be considered 
illegal in the target audience. Jihadi content on social networking sites in the Albanian 
language, most times, do not approach the public with full-fledged al Qaeda-type 
propaganda, as noted by Hoffman, rather, the jihad is framed carefully and often 
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disguised with harmless religious verses. At this point the researcher needs to be very 
careful which content to identify as jihadi information operations. In selecting the videos 
showing up from the initial search to include in our jihadi information operations 
database we consider if they fulfill the general conditions mentioned by Hoffman, but 
also consider elements forbidden by local laws in regards to inciting violence, 
discrimination, or the use of offensive language. We also identify as jihadi information 
operations the videos which promote a code of conduct condemned by local religious 
authorities, such as segregation and discrimination based on religious patterns, but also 
videos which promote important actions against the recommendations of the local 
religious leaders, such as the call to join the jihad in Syria. The participation of Albanians 
in the internal conflict of Syria, through the framing of it as a religious duty, is a salient 
problem nowadays in the Albanian-populated regions of the Balkans. In conclusion, our 
database also includes videos that seek the moral disengagement of the public and their 
recruitment into the jihadi cause, no matter if there is no direct call for violent action. The 
theory of selective moral disengagement has been elaborated by Albert Bandura (in 
Weimann, 2006) and it explains that in order to act people have to initially justify the 
morality of their actions (pp. 54–55). Weimann has adapted Bandura’s theory in order to 
detect a few rhetorical tactics used by terrorists to convince its recruits or potential 
recruits for engaging in terrorism. These tactics consist of distorting the relationship 
between the individual’s behavior and its outcome, distributing the responsibility, 
dehumanizing the targets, using euphemistic language, making advantageous 
comparisons, distorting sequences of events, and attributing the blame to the victims  
(pp. 55–56). 
The identification and selection of the results showing up from the initial search 
query might seem a difficult one, but it is worthy, since it allows the identification of 
YouTube channels, which can be made available for further analysis. Also, sometimes 
the process is very smooth since often jihadi-inspired videos are branded, either by the 
mentioning up-front of terrorist organizations or signature brands of jihadi media 
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organizations.11 Of course, the more familiar the researcher is with this sort of material, 
the easier it is to process the dataset. This step follows the principles of Weisburd’s 
“artisanal approach” and it is somewhat time-consuming,12 but to date there is no other 
automated way for obtaining data of similar quality.  
4. Creating the Dataset 
Once the jihadi information operations are identified properly it is necessary to 
extract data from within them in order to be in the dataset in a form that enables the 
researcher to conduct analysis.  
The data that we collect reflects the measurement data which are mentioned in the 
Table 2 and are in regard to the YouTube social networking site. An Excel spreadsheet is 
used to collect the data. The spreadsheet’s top row reflects the measuring values for the 
elements of success as recommended by prominent jihadi leaders. It is important to note 
that the research is video-based not channel-based. YouTube allows users to establish 
their own channels where they can air videos. Since the search on the search engine was 
conducted for videos (users can also research channels) containing the word jihad in 
Albanian, we focus on them. A detailed explanation of the data expected to be retrieved 
from exploring YouTube is found in the following paragraphs. 
  
11 In some cases during the research some videos were easy to exclude because they were not related 
to the jihad: some Albanian users of YouTube are named “Xhihad” (first name) and the videos uploaded by 
them kept showing as relevant, because of their names. We also excluded videos uploaded by national 
news channels, which use YouTube as a tool to upload and share video news, and also videos uploaded by 
well-known Albanian religious figures explaining concepts related with the jihad. 
12 In this case, the research (the query, the evaluation, and the collection of data into the prepared 
spreadsheet) took nearly 18 hours. We spent most of that time evaluating and processing the first 200 
videos out of 660 in total. The remaining videos were easily to evaluate and discard from the research. We 
spent mostly 10–15 minutes for each video that fulfilled the criteria for further procession.  
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a. Quantity and Outreach  
• Number of views: A numerical value which is reported for each 
video uploaded on the site. It reports the exact number of times a 
video has been requested to be watched by YouTube users. No 
matter if the video has been entirely viewed or it has been viewed 
multiple times by the same user (only if accessed through different 
access points, because YouTube does not count the viewings from 
the same access point, or same IP address, separately), the value 
retrieved would mean for the purposes of this analysis the 
numerical value of the attraction it has exercised for the whole 
period of the video has been present on YouTube. 
• Number of likes and/or dislikes: YouTube allows users to express 
their feelings about the videos by providing them two options: the 
like (thumb up) and dislike (thumb down). Each user may “vote” 
only once and decide whether he likes or dislikes the video. In 
order for users to express their feelings it is necessary to sign in 
through a Google account, since the site would not allow 
unregistered users to do that. This numerical value can also be 
interpreted as a stronger sign of attraction or repulsion, since the 
user engages with the content and provides feedback. These 
measures provide a more qualitative insight into the public 
performance of the video, rather than the number of views 
measure, given the greater effort put out by users to produce it.  
• Number of subscriptions driven by post: A numerical value which 
reports the number of users that subscribed to the channel that 
contains the video, because of the same video. This measure can 
also be used for analyzing the channel’s performance. 
• Time watched: This measure reports the cumulative time spent by 
users by watching a video. This measure is actually even better 
than the previous ones in matters of identifying the real interest of 
users toward the video. (Some users might just take a quick look 
and be counted as viewers the same as others who watch the video 
entirely. The quick viewers might also prejudice the video and 
express their feelings by liking or disliking it without waiting to 
watch the video until it ends.) This measure does not reflect the 
length of the video, which is a different measure. 
• Number of shares: This measure reflects the number of times the 




• Number of comments: This measure reflects the number of 
responses a video has generated. Only YouTube registered users 
can comment, although others may see the postings of the earlier 
viewers. 
• Number of videos posted by YouTube registered user: This 
measure reflects the number of videos posted on the channel. Only 
YouTube registered users are allowed to upload videos, and when 
they do, they automatically are considered as channels, rather than 
simple users. Of course this does not change anything from the 
perspective of the YouTube registered user since a user who has 
not uploaded a video can use the site the same as “channels.” 
b. Networking 
• Usernames of users interacting with the “channel:” This type of 
data consists of the usernames of other users interacting (writing 
comments) with a specific channel. The site policy does not allow 
users to share their usernames. The collection of this data enables 
the research to conduct social network analysis. Of course, only 
registered users are allowed to comment on YouTube. 
• Hyperlinks: YouTube channels or users may promote their videos 
or direct the audience into other Web spaces by posting Web links 
on their video spaces, or in the comments section. In building the 
dataset we first include a Yes/No column to indicate the presence 
or absence of hyperlink, then we collect the hyperlinks found in the 
videos showing from the results of the initial search. The 
linking/promotion of websites within the content produced by the 
users in their social media accounts is noted also by Gerger and 
Strathern (2013). 
• Names mentioned: We review titles of videos and comments in 
search of names of individuals, groups, or organizations that are 
mentioned within them. Those names are collected in a separate 
spreadsheet indication as well as the channel where it was found, 
and the user who mentioned the name. This data will be used for 
social networking analysis purposes. 
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c. Specific Tailoring 
• Language used: A quick overview of the video allows 
understanding whether the video contains information in the target 
language or not. This is a Yes/No type of observation. In case the 
language is same as the target language, then a second observation 
determines the type of dialect used. In this case, being a native 
Albanian, it is easy to identify the two main dialects of the 
Albanian language, the Gheg (common in the Northern Albania, 
Kosovo, Macedonia, and Montenegro) and the Tosk (common in 
the Southern and Central Albania). 
• Date of publication: This data reflects the date of publication of the 
video showing from the initial search. This kind of data may allow 
researchers to conduct temporal analysis.  
• Topic: This data is retrieved through a subjective determination. 
We establish sets of subjects of which might recur in conducting 
the research. The sets may be pre-established or re-established as 
the research goes on. We pre-establish six subject-based sets which 
are: 
• Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts related – Here fall the videos 
that report events occurring in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
• Syria conflict related – Here fall the videos reporting events 
occurring in Syria, or calling for joining the jihad in Syria. 
• Hate speech toward local customs in matters of religion – 
Here fall the videos containing hate speech toward local 
religious and cultural customs. 
• Western and Israeli hostility toward Islam – Here fall 
videos reporting the supposed hostility of Western 
countries (i.e., the United States) and Israel toward Islamic 
countries or Muslims around the world. 
• Promotion of jihadism without a specific context – Here 
fall videos calling for joining the jihad, promoting jihadism, 
and emphasizing the profits of embracing jihad, but without 
a specific context. 
• Appearance of prominent jihadi leaders – Here fall all the 
videos showing prominent jihadi leaders addressing the 
public. As Holbrook (2013) mentions:  
For the Al Qaeda leadership, this relates not only to contextualization and 
legitimization of past attacks or violent campaigns. Messages to the wider 
public must also demonstrate the continued relevancy of opinions and 
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options presented by the leadership and its ability to address concerns of 
those for whom the appeals are generated. (p. 886) 
Here we also identify whether the videos reflect a local presence or not. 
The local presence may be a recording within Albanian borders, or the presence of 
individuals from Albanian origin who are communicating one of the above topics. 
• Name of user (channel owner): The name of the channel owner is 
checked if it is a traditional Albanian name, or else.  
• Location of user: YouTube allows channel owners to report the 
location from where they are interacting. We collect this data if 
present. 
d. Audiovisual Exploitation 
• Quality of editing: The “quality of editing” may be coded by 
assignment of points. We apply the following system: 4 points, to 
material communicating messages released by members 
(conational) of the target audience; 3 points, to the material that is 
edited by including a voiceover in the language of the target 
audience; 2 points, to the material that is edited by including 
subtitles in the language of the target audience; 1 point, material in 
a foreign language, without translations or special editing to make 
it more comprehensible to the target audience.  
• Audiovisual quality: This measure is coded through a simple scale: 
3 points for high quality material; 2 points for average quality 
material; 1 point for poor quality material. This is a subjective 
determination, and thus it is recommended to keep the coding 
simple.  
• Branding: This measure is recorded through a Yes/No type of 
determination and reports whether internationally recognized jihadi 
badges are branding the video.  
Since the collection process includes the recording of a significant number 
of data it is recommended to set up the order of measures in the Excel spreadsheet as it 
fits better to the researcher’s needs. 
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D. RESULTS FROM THE DATASET ANALYSIS  
The dataset obtained through the collection on YouTube contains data from 84 
videos which are identified as jihadi information operations. Of course there may be other 
videos that may be identified as jihadi information operations if the search is conducted 
with other keywords in Albanian,13 but it goes beyond the purpose of this study. This 
study seeks to set an example on how research might be conducted to identify and test 
factors of success in jihadi information operations on the social media rather than 
analyzing the YouTube-based jihadism in the Albanian language. 
The data obtained from the collection process is quite vast and leaves room for 
different types of analysis.14 For the purpose of this study we conducted analysis that 
tests the factors of success recommended by prominent jihadi leaders for the conduct of 
jihadi information operations on the Internet.  
The analysis is conducted by identifying the element of “quantity and outreach” 
as an independent variable. It is fundamental for the jihadis, above all, to “speak and to 
be heard,” independent of how it is done. The production and the spread of jihadi 
messages are fundamental to the overall success of the jihad, since it not only 
communicates the jihadi ideology but also influences the recruitment and donations to the 
cause. In the social networking sites domain, if jihadi information operations approach as 
many social networking site users as possible then it is considered that they have 
successfully fulfilled their mission.  
As to the build-up of the dataset, the element of quantity and outreach in 
YouTube was set to be represented by the numerical values of views, likes, subscriptions, 
the time that singular videos were watched, shares, comments, and the overall number of 
videos posted by the channel (user). The number of views is the most representative 
among the other values since it is the one that is always reported, independently of the 
will of the channel owner. The analysis based on this value needs to take in account also 
13 There might also be other jihadi videos that promote jihadism, but that do not show up through 
conducting searches by keywords. The purpose here is to analyze only those videos that promote the jihad 
and that do it as publicly as possible.  
14 A copy of the dataset is provided by the author to the NPS CORE Lab and it may be released by 
request for free. Contact the NPS Core Lab at:  http://www.npscorelab.com/. 
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the time factor. Videos that have been online for a longer time have had more chances to 
become more popular than others, thus it is needed to normalize these values. Thus, we 
divide the number of views by the number of days the video has been online and obtain a 
derivate value that represents the views per day of each video (see Table 3).  
 
 Ordering by number of views 
regardless of the time being 
online 
Ordering by the number of views per 
day 
Ranking Video15 Views Video Views Views/day 
1 ***nah_1 41622 ***nal_1 14974 365.2 
2 ***dii_3 39386 ***l1m_2 29069 363.4 
3 ***l1m_2 29069 ***ter_1 9008 214.5 
4 ***HGT_1 23759 ***nah_1 41622 165.8 
5 ***nal_1 14974 ***jda_1 5003 142.9 
Table 3.   The five most popular (in terms of number of views and number of 
views/day) jihadi information operations from the dataset. 
As noted in Table 3 the videos resulting in the “Top-5” in the two orderings are either 
different or rank differently. In order to have a complete overview of the most popular 
jihadi information operations in the dataset there is needed to describe them briefly. The 
description is based on the data found within the dataset.  
The video “***nah_1,” ranking first in the ordering by the number of views, is a 
recently posted (March 2013) video showing an Albanian mujahedeen in Syria among 
other foreign mujahedeen fighters. The video performance in terms of the quantity and 
outreach element measures is above the average. It is also the most watched16 (time 
watched calculated in hours), the most commented (383 comments), and it contains a 
15 The identification of videos is altered on purpose. The unaltered version of the identification of the 
videos is found in the dataset, which can be requested from the NPS CORE Lab. 
16 Considered from among the videos, for which this measure was made possible for public 
consultation. Information about this measure is made available to the public at the channel owner’s 
discretion.  
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hyperlink (encouraging the public to connect through a Facebook profile). On the other 
hand, it is of a poor audiovisual quality 
The third (***l1m_2) and the fifth (***nal_1) videos are quite similar to the first 
in ranking except for the lower number of views and the audiovisual quality. They are 
also recent and relate to the jihad in Syria. The number of comments generated on these 
videos is above the average. As mentioned previously these videos are of a higher 
audiovisual quality and they are both branded. 
The second (***dii_3) and the fourth (***HGT_1) videos have a few differences 
from the other three videos. They are quite old (dating back respectively to March 2009, 
and February 2007) and they are related to a general perspective of the jihad. The second 
video also provides a hyperlink for the public and it is branded by an audiovisual editing 
studio identified with an Albanian name. The fourth video has fewer elements of success 
(networking, local signs, and audiovisual quality). 
The ranking, with the ordering by the number of views per day, is slightly 
different from the first ranking. The three Syria-related videos from the first ordering are 
still present and the video ranking first is a video portraying an Albanian mujahedeen 
calling in Albanian for joining the jihad in Syria. As to this ordering all the videos are 
related to the Syrian jihad, and in terms of elements of success, these videos more closely 
follow the recommendations of prominent jihadi leaders in terms of showing local 
affiliations. The quantity and outreach measures perform better and their values are 
beyond the average of the measures of the whole dataset, and the audiovisual quality 
measures are almost at top levels. All the videos are quite recent, with the oldest dating 
back to March 2013, the most recent from October 2013. The performance of these 
videos in terms of quantity and outreach not only shows a predisposition of videos 
promoting the joining of jihad in Syria being the most popular, but it also shows that the 
participation of Albanians in the Syrian jihad is also backed by successful jihadi 
information operations online.  
Other observations from the analysis of the first element’s measures that certify 
the prominent jihadis’ recommendations are the results of some simple regression 
analysis. The measures put to analysis are the number of subscriptions (general) and the 
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number of videos posted (general) by the channel. The number of subscriptions is better 
than the number of views as a measure of the potential success of a jihadi campaign as 
viewers (from the perspective of YouTube) may be also individuals who occasionally 
wander into the Web and continuously check the content without paying a lot of attention 
to it. Subscribers are more committed to the contents that are posted by selected channels. 
A subscriber is interested in the type of videos posted by a selected channel. In this case 
there is a high positive correlation between those measures, a correlation value of 0.7188. 
In simple words the more the videos are uploaded by the channel the higher the number 
of subscriptions.  
By increasing the number of subscribers, channels have more opportunities to 
tailor their messages toward influencing their subscribers’ opinions. It is mentioned 
earlier that jihadi activists on the Internet do not come out as fully-fledged al Qaeda 
supporters; rather they carefully reveal their messages, by including also general religious 
narratives. The same can be said about the channels that are part of the dataset. Through a 
quick overview, some of these channels contain more videos that can hardly be classified 
as jihadi information operations. But that may be part of the jihadi information strategy. 
YouTube users can be attracted by general Islamic videos, which make them subscribe to 
a channel that later exposes them jihadi videos. The exposure is guaranteed since the 
subscription mechanism enables the promotion of videos aired by subscribed channels 
first, and then other videos.  
Another regression that certifies the quantity and outreach recommendation is the 
one that analyzes the number of views measure with the number of days online of the 
videos. The correlation is positive and its value is 0.2407. In simple words, the longer a 
video stays online, the greater the number of times it will be seen by general users. The 
number of communications is not the only factor that increases popularity of the jihadi 
cause; the stable presence of the message among the public is also important. The 
Internet provides an excellent depository for jihadi messages, and social networking sites 
make it even easier than the traditional Web to encounter those types of messages.  
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The testing of the second recommendation, the networking for jihad, represents a 
difficult task. On the other hand, research on the networking elements, can be very 
profitable in terms of identifying and targeting for further research elements of the 
dataset. The analysis here incorporates also with the third recommendation element, the 
localization of the jihad. 
Figure 3 shows the connection of YouTube users (commenting) on the respective 
videos, which are colored by the topic they promote. As mentioned earlier very 
interactive users (those who comment in two or more videos) can be identified 
immediately and targeted for further research. Users of this type may be also identified as 
very interactive and very competent interactive users, in the case they comment on videos 
promoting different topics. The sociogram presented in Figure 3 contains some of these 
individuals. For the purpose of this study there is no need to conduct further analysis on 
these users, but the possibility of extending the research is feasible. By processing the 
networking and localization elements through SNA software and methodologies it is 
possible to conduct further analysis and obtain relative results that may serve beyond the 
purpose of simply measuring success and failure of jihadi information operations on the 
social networking sites. 
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 Figure 3.  Visualization obtained through ORA Network Visualizer. The visualization 
represents the network of interacting users (commenters) and the jihadi 
information operations which are colored by subject. (Afghanistan/Iraq in 
grey; general call to jihad in dark purple; jihadi leaders in peach; Syrian 
conflict in green; and West vs. Islam in yellow). 
The following figure (Figure 4) shows that the majority of jihadi information 
operations are related to subjects such as the general call to jihad and the Syrian conflict. 
From an Albanian perspective this subject-based setup of jihadi information operations 
are not in the least concurrent with local narratives. The small number of videos on the 
Afghanistan/Iraq jihadi campaigns cannot be larger since the countries share almost 
nothing in common and the geographic distance makes it even harder to make the cause 
compelling to Albanians. The same applies to the West vs. Islam videos. Albanians are 
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very pro-Western and it is hard to change the narratives on that perspective. A different 
situation is presented by the large number of videos promoting jihadism in general and 
also the joining of the jihad in Syria.  
Similar to the previous visualization it is possible to identify special “actors” 
within this sociogram. In this case, the users would be channel owners and the very 
proactive ones would be those who have uploaded two or more videos. Moreover, the 
highly competent ones would be the channel owners who have posted videos on two or 
more subjects. YouTube channel owners with these characteristics can be easily spotted 
from the sociogram. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Visualization obtained through ORA Network Visualizer. The triangles (red) 
represent the jihadi information operations, the squares (by color) the class of 
topic which they address, and the circles (black) the channel owners.  
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As in the previous case, after special “actors” have been identified they can be targeted 
for further research and analysis.  
The last recommended element, the audiovisual effect, is tested through 
regression analysis, and by taking the number of views, and the number of views per day 
values as independent variables, while the editing quality and audiovisual quality 
measures are taken as dependent variables. The results show that both sets of correlations 
are positive and quite statistically significant17; that is, if the videos are better edited 
(with more local features) and are of a better audiovisual quality, the number of views 
and average views per day is expected to be higher.  
In conclusion it may be asserted that the prominent jihadi leaders 
recommendations on how to conduct the jihad on the Internet more effectively are valid 
and important. At this point the recommended elements become tested factors of success 
of jihadi information operations. By contrast, disregarding these recommendations may 
result in a failure of the jihadi information operations, especially on the social networking 
sites.  
  
17 The correlation value between the views per day and the editing quality is 0.4253, and the 
correlation value between the views per day and the audiovisual quality is 0.2656. 
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VI. COMBINED SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
COUNTERING JIHADI INFORMATION OPERATIONS  
ON THE INTERNET 
A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 
Jihadis will continue to use the Internet as their primary tool for conducting 
information operations. The transitioning from the use of Web 1.0 to the use of Web 2.0 
applications may be slow but it is inevitable; that is because jihadis need to reach the 
wider public independently, whether they successfully influence it or not. In approaching 
social networking sites jihadis face problems associated with the lack of knowledge of 
how to exploit them, but also with the restrictions applied by counterterrorism bodies. By 
raising popularity scores on the Web, jihadis may attract the attention of counterterrorist 
forces. The lack of a centralized information management structure contributes to a 
further degradation of jihadi information operations on the Web. With the al Qaeda 
leadership being hunted and cracked down on there is no sign of a potential 
reestablishment of the information management structure as it existed in the pre-9/11 era. 
The future of jihadi information operations belongs to lone jihadis or smaller 
disconnected groups of individuals. From a counterterrorist perspective the decentralized 
(or leaderless) jihad presents new challenges, especially in the information management 
and intelligence gathering fields. Jihadi activists on the Internet may exploit the 
opportunities offered by the Internet without any significant restrictions. In a scenario 
where counterterrorist forces have no means to control the information flow on the 
Internet, the jihadists may be at an advantage. Still the advantages are proportionally 
related to the portion of the wider public that makes use of the Internet. As societies go 
digital counterterrorist forces can also develop capabilities to counter threats coming 
from the Internet. While a scenario where everything that goes online passes through 
diligent security and counterterrorist checks is not feasible in the short term, 
counterterrorist forces need to develop alternative capabilities to exert a limited but 
meaningful control over what goes on the Web.  
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The identification of factors of success of jihadi information operations on social 
networking sites attempts to provide to counterterrorist forces a tool to distinguish 
important and potentially important jihadi information operations from among the vast 
amount of jihadi-inspired Web spaces. Besides the identification of the factors of success, 
within the thesis is found also a methodology that guides researchers and analysts in 
building their own datasets, with which the prominent jihadis recommendations on the 
conduct of the information campaign can be put to the test. In this study the four elements 
framed in accordance with the recommendations of prominent jihadis were tested and 
found to be valid, and as such, they are proven factors.  
The quantity and outreach factor emphasizes that the more jihadis communicate 
and attempt to reach the public, the wider is their impact in terms of public attention 
driven toward their communication. 
The networking factor highlights that networked efforts contribute to a better 
distribution and larger publicity to jihadi information operations. 
The specific tailoring factor emphasizes that jihadi information operations need to 
be shaped to the public they attempt to influence. Forwarding messages in the right 
language with local symbols and matching the local narrative makes these messages 
perform better in terms of public attraction. 
The audiovisual exploitation factor highlights that better edited and a better 
audiovisual quality of the messages makes jihadi information operations more popular. 
These factors may also serve for different purposes, starting from the assessment 
of jihadi information strategies, to the identification of key jihadi Web activists, who can 
be closely monitored and targeted by counterterrorist forces. By assessing jihadi 
information strategies on the Internet counterterrorist forces may also plan and conduct 
counteractions with the purpose of extending the collection of intelligence, rather than 
simply shutting these Web spaces down.  
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B. OPTIONS FOR COUNTERING JIHADI INFORMATION OPERATIONS 
ON THE INTERNET 
The Internet would be safer without jihadi information operations, but it would 
also be also useless for obtaining intelligence about jihadi information strategies. 
Between the total absence and the undisturbed presence there is a wide array of options, 
which allow counterterrorist agencies to increase their chances for intelligence collection, 
while simultaneously countering the jihadi presence on the Web. The options should be 
shaped in line with the concept of noise in communication processes, which was 
interpreted from a counter jihadism perspective by Weimann and Von Knop (2008). 
Practically, counterterrorism bodies should interfere in the communication between 
terrorist and the public, by applying various actions, ranging from the countering of 
narratives to the shutting down of terrorist websites (p. 891–892). The shutting down 
option, of course, does not provide a terminal solution to jihadism on the Web. Instead, 
what may be more beneficial is applying strategies for continuous collection of 
intelligence on the uses of the Internet by jihadis. Berger (2013) also observes in regard 
to the challenge of countering jihadism on the Internet, “the strategy doesn’t have to be 
an all-or-nothing proposition.” 
Below there are some options available to the counterterrorist agencies for 
exercising pressure on jihadist Web spaces in order to obtain better and fresher 
intelligence:  
• Controlled shutdown of websites, social networking sites accounts, pages, 
etc.:  This option calls for a controlled shutdown of terrorist spaces on the 
Web in order to scatter a reappearance, which would generate fresh 
intelligence. Berger (2013) cites the case of the manipulation of Twitter 
accounts of terrorist groups in order to diminish their respective followers. 
He describes the take-down and resurgence of the al-Shabab Twitter 
account. The result was that the number of the followers of that account 
was reduced meaningfully. As to Berger, that experience provides a 
positive feedback, since it may allow counterterrorist bodies first to make 
terrorists less influential, and second, to obtain better intelligence, given 
the reduced number of followers, who may be considered as interested 
subjects with similar goals and beliefs to those of the terrorists. 
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• Inducing fear to discover the fearless and the fearsome: This option calls 
for distribution of false statements on potential infiltration of 
counterterrorist forces on the jihad Web space. That would be followed by 
close monitoring of the Web space in order to analyze the generated result. 
• Cyber-herding: This option reflects the strategy developed by Moon 
(2007). The strategy is called cyber-herding and refers to “the action by 
which an individual, group, or organization drives individuals, groups, or 
organizations to a desired location within the electronic realm.” The 
strategy is based on the ambiguity of the Internet, and the weakness of 
trust-development of it. As Moon explains, “cyber-herding has the 
potential to covertly neutralize undesirable websites, mine data from 
controlled websites, map virtual social networks, manipulate extremist 
websites, and manipulate the extremist’s story.” Moon also forwards an 
action plan, by identifying structures and phases for the take-down of 
extremist websites. 
• Promotion of counterviews or deceptive Web spaces: This option calls for 
an assisted promotion of Web spaces that participate in the Web jihad with 
a softer “voice” or that increases discrepancies between jihadis. This 
option may resonate a sort of “divide and conquer” type of strategy.  
• Creating honeypots: This option calls for the creation of honeypot spaces 
(carefully managed Web spaces that allow Web space managers to 
identify the visiting users by retrieving their IP addresses) in order to 
gather digital information on the interested users.  
• Spreading viruses or worms in jihadi websites: This option calls for 
introducing computer viruses or worms in jihadi Web spaces in order to 
cause damage or enable the infiltration of the jihadist computers. Kaste 
(2012) describes a virus called “Flame” which enables intelligence 
collecting through individual computers previously inflected. 
• Exploiting Web space codes of conduct: Every social networking site has 
rules regarding the posting of content by users. These postings should not 
contain audiovisual material that promote the violation of human rights, 
are disrespectful, or against the law. The identification of irregular 
postings may be flagged by counterterrorist users in order to trigger action 
by site managers, especially in the case of social networking sites. 
• Using counterterrorist branded messages: This option calls for inducing 
branded messages from counterterrorist users on jihadi Web spaces in 
order to acknowledge jihadis for an ongoing intelligence gathering 
operation. The option is based on the practice of police lights and sirens in 
dangerous urban areas, an appliance which causes a stall and silence 
during the presence of the lights and sirens. As Arquilla and Rondfeldt 
(2009) maintain, “if our enemies came to see cyberspace as insecure, they 
would probably flee the virtual domain” (p. 63). 
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These options should aim toward enabling counter terrorist forces to gather more 
information in order to shape better strategies to counter jihadism on the Web and on the 
ground. Information is very precious for both parts, but at the end only the ones who 
exploit it better will win the war.  
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Population  2,800,138 1,739,825 2,022,547 3,879,296 620,029 
Muslims 58.79 % 95.6 % 33.33 % 40 % 19.1 % 
Catholics 10.24 % 2.2 % 0.34 % 15 % 3.4 % 
Christian Orthodox 6.75 % 1.4 % 64.78 % 31 % 72 % 
Believers w/o den. 5.49 % - - - - 
Atheists 2.50 % - - - 1.2 % 
Others 0.02 % 0.1 % 1.55 % 14 % 1.7 % 
No answer/No relevant 16.33 % 0.6 % - - 2.6 % 










62 1 Croatia 46 




75 4 Montenegro 41 
80 5 Serbia 39 
105 6 Kosovo 34 
113 7 Albania 33 
Table 5.   The South East Europe (SEE) countries Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) 
2012. In the global chart Denmark was positioned first with 90 points and 
Somalia as last with 174 points (from Transparency International, 2013) 
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Al Haramain Foundation Egyptian Islamic 
Jihad (EIJ) 
















World Assembly of 














(aka Abdyl Gani), 
Algerian 







  Salafi, 1993‒2002, 
2005 
Global Relief 
Foundation (GRF) (aka 
Secours Mondial) 
  ?‒2005 
Ayatollah Khomeini 
Society 
  1991‒2002 
Al-Furqan   ?‒2002 
Table 6.   Islamic organizations in Albania linked with terrorism (from Kullolli, 2009) 
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Visual Analytics representations on Islamic organizations and  





Figure 6.  GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s grid view. The terrorist 
attacks in Albania, Bosnia, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo, from 
1991‒2011, extracted from the amount of terrorist attacks that occurred in the 
Balkan. The attacks that were perpetrated by Islamic-related groups who 
were identified as attackers have occurred only in Bosnia Herzegovina, 
Croatia, and Hungary; nevertheless most of the attackers are not identified 





Other – 435/923 
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Figure 7.  GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s grid view. The terrorist 
attacks of unidentified perpetrators in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Albania, divided 
by their affiliation. See Figure 8 for a temporal distribution of the attacks. 
 
 
Figure 8.  GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s Timeline view. The terrorist 
attacks occurred in Albania from 1990‒2011. The peak coincides with the 












Figure 9.  GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s Timeline view. The terrorist 
attacks occurred in Kosovo from 1990‒2011. The peak coincides with the 
years 1999‒2001, when the Kosovo Albanian started the war against Serbian 
authorities requesting independence. Although a United Nations-mandated 
international military contingent occupied the strategic areas, since June 1999 
after Serbian Army retreated from the province, in attempt to establish a 
buffer zone between Kosovo Serbs and Kosovo Albanians, the attacks 
continued by ethnic paramilitary groups of both sides. 
 
 
Figure 10.  GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s Timeline view. The terrorist 
attacks occurred in Bosnia from 1990‒2011. The peak coincides with the 
years 1992‒1998, a period of high tension within the country due to political 
disagreements and ethnic clashes, despite the war being officially over since 




Figure 11.  GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s Timeline view. The terrorist 
attacks occurred in Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia from 1990‒2011. 
 
Figure 12.  Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s link analysis 
tool, Auto view. The Balkans Islamic-oriented organization’s network, 
1992‒2004. 
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Nr. Betweeness Closenness Degree Eigenvector 
1.  Active Islamic 
Youth (AIO) 
Al Haramain in 
Albania 
Al Qaeda Al Qaeda 
2.  Ej Mujahid 
Brigade 






3.  Al Haramain in 
Albania 




4.  Al Qaeda Al Qaeda Al Haramain in 
Bosnia 
Al Haramain in 
Bosnia 





6.  Supreme 
Committee for 
the Collections of 
Donations for 
Bosnia (SCCDB) 
SCCDB SCCDB Al Haramain in 
Albania 
7.  7th Muslim 
Liberation 
Brigade 
BIF Al Haramain 
Albania 
SCCDB 




3rd Corps BMA 3rd Corps BMA 













Figure 13.  Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s Social Network 
Analysis Tool. The centralities of the ten most central Islamic-related 




Figure 14.  Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s link analysis 
tool, Auto view. The Balkans Islamic-oriented NGOs, charities, and globally 
recognized terrorist organizations’ network, 1992‒2004. See Figure 15 for 
further explanation on links. 
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Figure 15.  Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s link analysis 
tool, Histogram. The Balkans Islamic-oriented NGOs, charities, and globally 
recognized terrorist organizations’s network, 1992‒2004. The numbers 
following the entities show the number of links within the network. 
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Figure 16.  Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s link analysis 
tool, Auto view. The Balkans Islamic-oriented NGOs and charities network, 
1992‒2004. See Figure 17 for the importance of each in terms of centrality 
within the network. 
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 Nr. Betweeness Closenness Degree Eigenvector 
1.  Supreme 
Committee for 
the Collections of 
Donations for 
Bosnia (SCCDB) 
SCCDB SCCDB SCCDB 
2.  Al Haramain in 
Bosnia (AHB) 
AHB AHB AHB 
3.  Al Haramain in 
Albania (AHA) 



















Table 7.   Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s Social 
Network Analysis Tool. The centralities of the five most central Islamic 




Figure 17.  Selected bibliographical sources analyzed through Palantir’s link analysis 
tool, Auto view, and Search Around. The Islamic-related entities, and events 
in Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo, 1992‒2012. At the top are the Islamic-
related organizations, while on the flanks can be found entities connected 
directly to them. The Search Around feature of Palantir enables phased 
research. From top to bottom (flanks) are entities connected sequentially with 
each other. At the bottom there is the same representation, including the 





Figure 18.  GTD Project Data visualized through Palantir’s Map, using the Heatmap 
Density Tool, with a Radius of 15 km and Area Unit 1 km2. The terrorist 
attacks occurred in Albania, Kosovo, and Bosnia from 1990‒2011. Note 
highest density hotspots in Bosnia coincide with the AOR of foreign Islamic 
paramilitary forces, Zenica in central Bosnia, and Moaca Gornja in the 
Northeast of the country. 
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